

FOSTERING DIALOGUE, DRIVING CHANGE

Indonesian Civil Society
Advancing Democracy





Reflection Note ICSF 2024

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Indonesia (<i>Alliance of Independent Journalists</i>)
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (<i>National Counter Terrorism Agency</i>)
BPS	Badan Pusat Statistik (<i>Statistics Indonesia</i>)
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CF	Corporate Foundation
CIVICUS	World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (<i>The House of Representatives</i>)
GBM	Grassroot-Based Movement
EIU	The Economist's Intelligence Unit
FPI	Front Pembela Islam (<i>Islamic Defenders Front</i>)
GEDSI	Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion
Gerak Aceh	Gerakan Antikorupsi Aceh (<i>Anti-Corruption Movement Aceh</i>)
Gerindra	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (<i>The Great Indonesia Movement Party</i>)
Golkar	Partai Golongan Karya (<i>The Party of the Functional Groups</i>)
HAM	Hak-hak Asasi Manusia (<i>Human Rights</i>)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICSF	Indonesia Civil Society Forum
ICW	Indonesia Corruption Watch
IKOMS	Indeks Keberlanjutan Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (<i>Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index</i>)
Infid	International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
IPAK	Indeks Perilaku Anti Korupsi (<i>Anti-Corruption Behavior Index</i>)
JPLKI	Jaringan Penyedia Layanan Keamanan Integral (<i>The Integral Security Service Provider Network</i>)

Kemendagri	Kementerian Dalam Negeri (<i>Ministry of Home Affairs</i>)
Kemenkumham	Kementerian Hukum dan HAM (<i>Ministry of Law and Human Right</i>)
Kesbangpol	Badan Dinas Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (<i>National Unity and Political Agency</i>)
KIM	Koalisi Indonesia Maju (<i>Advanced Indonesia Coalition</i>)
KKB	Koalisi Kebebasan Berserikat (<i>Coalition for Freedom of Association</i>)
KKI Warsi	Komunitas Konservasi Indonesia Warsi (<i>Indonesian Conservation Community Warsi</i>)
KontraS	Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (<i>Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence</i>)
KPK	Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (<i>Corruption Eradication Commission</i>)
KUHP	Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (<i>Criminal Code</i>)
LBH APIK	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (<i>Indonesian Women's Association for Justice Legal Aid</i>)
LSM	Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (<i>Non-Governmental Organisation</i>)
MATA	Masyarakat Transparansi (<i>Transparency Society</i>)
MK	Mahkamah Konstitusi (<i>Constitutional Court</i>)
NAD	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
NGBM	Non-Grassroot-Based Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSSC	NGO Service and Study centre
NU	Nahdatul Ulama (<i>Revival of the Ulama</i>)
OMS	Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (<i>Civil Society Organisation</i>)
Ormas	Organisasi Kemasyarakatan (<i>Mass Organisation</i>)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (<i>The National Mandate Party</i>)
PBB	Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (<i>United Nations</i>)
PDIP	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (<i>Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle</i>)

Permenkominfo	Peraturan Menteri Komunikasi dan Informatika (<i>Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology</i>)
PGN	Patriot Garuda Nusantara (<i>Garuda Nusantara Patriots</i>)
Pilkada	Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (<i>Regional Election</i>)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (<i>The National Awakening Party</i>)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (<i>The Prosperous Justice Party</i>)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (<i>The United Development Party</i>)
PSN	Proyek Strategis Nasional (<i>National Strategic Project</i>)
PWF	People's Water Forum
RSF	Rapporteur sans Frontiers/Reporters without Borders
RUU	Rancangan Undang-undang (<i>Bill</i>)
SAKA	Sekolah Antikorupsi Aceh (<i>Aceh Anti-Corruption School</i>)
SKT	Surat Keterangan Terdaftar (<i>Tax Registration Certificate</i>)
SLAPP	Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation
TPOA	Tim Pengawas Ormas Asing (<i>Foreign NGO Monitoring Team</i>)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UU	Undang-Undang (<i>Law</i>)
UU ITE	Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik (<i>the Law on Electronic Information and Transactions</i>)
UU PNPS	Undang-Undang Pencegahan, Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama (<i>Law on the Prevention of the Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion</i>)
UU TPKS	Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Kekerasan Seksual (<i>Law on Sexual Violence Crimes</i>)
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (<i>Indonesian Forum for the Environment</i>)
YAPPIKA	Yayasan Penguatan Partisipasi, Inisiatif, dan kemitraan Masyarakat Indonesia (<i>The Peoples Participation, Initiative and Partnerships Strengthening Foundation</i>)
YLBHI	Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation</i>)

PREFACE

With the theme “Fostering Dialogue, Driving Change: Indonesian Civil Society Advancing Democracy,” the main session of the Indonesia Civil Society Forum (ICSF) 2024 took place in Jakarta from September 25–26, building on the success of previous years. The overall goals of ICSF 2024 were to establish a safe space for civil society, develop strategies, and offer key ideas on the current situation and the possible future of civic space and democracy in Indonesia.

Three subjects were selected for ICSF 2024: resisting pressure on civic space; the situation of human rights defenders and CSOs; and strengthening civil society networks and collaboration among actors, sectors, regions, and generations.

The ICSF 2024 implementation format blends keynote speaker, trust-building, and group discussions. By presenting each participant as resources, the design has been successful in making the ICSF forum interactive, collaborative, and participatory with a few particular considerations and technical solutions.

This exercise has involved no fewer than 250 participants and resource persons across the country. They enthusiastically exchanged ideas, perspectives, experiences, and lessons learned from their individual experiences. Participants represented a range of sectors, including women, human rights defenders, disability activists, civil society and youth activists, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

The ICSF 2024 is jointly organised by Indika Foundation, Humanis Foundation, and YAPPIKA as the Organising Committee with Ford Foundation as the chair. They are led by a Steering Committee made up of experts from development partners and Indonesian CSOs who arrange the event, choose the subjects and speakers, and share the financial burden. Technically, Indonesian CSOs are in charge of hosting the group discussions.

After being hosted by USAID from 2018 to 2023, ICSF is now transitioning to local ownership by increasing its scope through regional forums and the writing of reflection notes. Three regional ICSF forums were hosted; in Medan on June 25–26 (for Sumatra and Kalimantan) by BITRA (Bina Ketrampilan Pedesaan) Indonesia, in Makassar on July 16–17 (for Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Papua and Maluku) by BaKTI Foundation (Bursa Pengetahuan Kawasan Timur Indonesia), and in Yogyakarta on July 30–31 (for Java and Bali) collaboratively hosted by SIGAB (Sasana Inklusi dan Gerakan Advokasi Difabel) and IRE (Institute for Research and Empowerment). Around 80 participants attended each regional ICSF and some of them attended the main forum in Jakarta in September



Following the main event, the Organising Committee produced the ICSF 2024 Reflection Note, which you are currently reading. This note aims to propose strategic choices for CSO engagement in a democratic Indonesia, including ways to consolidate CSOs. The main sources for this document are the rapporteur's notes, discussion minutes, and process recordings. To augment these sources, the drafting team consulted a variety of books, interviews, and news clips.

The sources engaged have contributed a wealth of information that will be put into a thoughtful note. Focus discussions have also been place to provide additional information and analysis to this note. Several professionals reviewed and provided feedback on drafts of this paper.

Many people's efforts made this note feasible. First and foremost are the ICSF 2024 speakers and attendees who offered their insights and experiences. Indonesian CSOs are the legitimate proprietors of ICSF 2024, as seen by their enthusiasm and energy at the national forum and the three regional forums. Throughout the ICSF 2024 rounds, the facilitators assisted in establishing a safe space for the voices of civil society. In order to prepare this note, the process recorders supplied extremely helpful written materials that were processed and examined.

Hans Antlov and Meutia Ganie-Rochman provided valuable feedback and suggestions to improve a few specific parts of this work. Amalinda Savirani was a great discussion partner who kindly contributed more materials and thorough critical comments to help this note get better. Remote interviews with Dian Indraswari from Pulih Foundation, Irma from Communication for Change, and Nenden Sekar Arum from SAFEnet all helped with the writing process. In addition to these, several parties who cannot be named individually contributed to the ICSF 2024 Reflection Notes.

Hopefully, with the support of various parties, this note will be a useful resource for the progress of civil society, democracy, and human rights in Indonesia.

Warm regards,

ICSF 2024 Steering Committee

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REFLECTION NOTE
INDONESIA CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM 2024

Background

In ICSF 2024, ICSF generated a “Reflection Note” for the first time. An extensive knowledge of how Indonesian CSOs continue to protect democracy is given in this note. To interact with the public and build their networks, CSOs employ a range of tactics. Discussions at the ICSF regional and national meetings, as well as a number of focus groups and consultations held from July to October, served as the basis for the ICSF Reflection Note.

The ICSF 2024 Reflection Note outlines the difficulties faced by CSOs in Indonesia, including the shrinking space for CSOs, oppression, resistance, and crisis. CSOs have experienced various forms of oppression, such as stigmatisation, physical violence, intimidation, criminalisation, digital attacks, and administrative control. Internal issues among CSOs have resulted from this, including lack of collaboration, moving away from grassroots communities, and inadequate attention to holistic security.

Main Conclusion

This note emphasises the importance of adapting to local contexts and the need for CSOs to influence and adapt to unique social and cultural environments. Public perception of CSOs remains a contested space, with governments using mass and social media to disseminate information about them. CSOs face severe funding models and financial resilience difficulties due to their reliance on foreign donors and few alternative funding sources.

The four ICSF sessions focused on how civil society activists, CSO staff, development workers, and human rights defenders in Indonesia have faced pressure and restrictions from the state's repressive infrastructure, which includes the military, police, and other instruments of violence.

The patterns of repression faced by CSOs in civic space are highly diversified and recurring, happening at various times, events, locations, and subjects, and are distinguished by high case rates, overlapping incidents, and deliberate horizontal conflicts among different groups.



Stigmatisation and defamation of CSOs are critical in countering civil society criticism and resistance, particularly among those working in human rights, environmental issues, and anti-corruption. This method is intended to harm communities' reputations and undermine the validity of activists, human rights defenders, and CSOs.

Digital attacks and internet restrictions, which use digital technology, have made authoritarianism more accessible and cost-effective than previous techniques that depend solely on state apparatus. Scholars have identified six main components of digital authoritarianism: surveillance, censorship, social media manipulation and harassment, cyberattacks, internet shutdowns, and online persecution of netizens. For CSOs, digital technology infrastructure is a major weakness that is frequently targeted by states.

Additionally, the government has disseminated false information about CSOs in public places, claiming that they are foreign agents or exploiting poverty. Violations by individuals associated with CSOs further reinforce the stigma that CSOs are extortionists or opportunists.

However, CSOs don't consciously work to create favorable public perceptions. CSOs must create efficient communication plans to safeguard their reputations and enhance public perceptions because of their diminished status in the public discourse and media. It appears that CSOs remain efficient alternative development partners because institutional donors and international development organisations continue to work with them.

Indonesian CSOs suffer internal issues while under constant criticism. These limitations, as stated by ICSF 2024 participants, hinder their ability to successfully respond to sustained state pressure. "Moving Away from the Grassroots" is a critical self-reflection on the rising gap between CSOs and grassroots communities, as identified by ICSF participants from all areas.

Among the contributing causes include the use of bureaucratic tactics in CSO operations, as well as the inclination for a technocratic approach to influence government policy. Individualistic behavior and low levels of collaboration among CSOs were heavily discussed during the ICSF 2024. As a result, participants tend to operate separately rather than utilising network's infrastructure.

However, the usage of social media and the digital space has resulted in a new understanding of local context. The traditional definition of local, which encompasses the social, cultural, and political environment and actors within geographical boundaries, is no longer relevant in the digital age. In digital space, CSOs are no longer the only ones who manage the game.

In contrast, the digital landscape includes state agencies with the power to regulate internet infrastructure, commercial access providers, identified and anonymous players, and those that use artificial intelligence and bots. With the presence of these actors, the digital world becomes a contested space to shape narratives and influence public opinion. In order to balance the narratives created by the state, CSOs must thus step up their adaptation efforts to fill the digital void and create alternative narratives.

In ICSF 2024, funding for CSOs has been a prominent subject, particularly in regional forums. Discussions have revealed that one of the main obstacles CSOs encounter in preserving public space is money. Access to fund can provide CSOs with numerous chances to operate more efficiently within the civil society ecosystem, which has been a major theme of these discussions.

CSOs financial issues are not all the same. The capacity of CSOs to obtain funding varies depending on their years of operation, history of establishment, reputation, social capital, and network. Although foreign donors continue to be a significant source of support for CSOs, their funding rules need to be modified to account for this range of capabilities (Davies, 2020). In order to resolve these inequities, donors must acknowledge the different capacities of CSOs and create flexible funding strategies.

With varying results, Indonesian CSOs are starting to investigate alternate financing sources in an effort to lessen their reliance on foreign funding. Just 34 percent of respondents to a study on financial resilience for CSOs in Indonesia reported receiving grants from donor organisations to increase the sustainability of organisational funding (YAPPIKA, 2021). However, only 11 percent of recipient groups were able to reduce their reliance on donors.

A number of CSOs have raised money by appealing to the charity of the people. Considering Indonesia's immense potential, this is intriguing. According to the World Giving Index, Indonesia has emerged as the world's most generous country in the past ten years. Although secular philanthropic groups have also contributed, Indonesia's philanthropy sector has expanded quickly over the past 15 years, with a focus on religious (primarily Islamic) institutions (Hartnell, t.t.).

Finally, talent and training functions were identified as crucial to supporting the civil society ecosystem; however, CSOs face challenges in recruiting and retaining young activists.



The absence of dedicated funding and development support services for new CSOs is another issue raised in the note. Incubation and acceleration services provided by service provider organisations can assist emerging CSOs in building their organisational structures and accessing resources and collaboration opportunities. Universities and other organisations are examples of potential actors offering these services.

Participants in ICSF 2024 recognised that age differences hinder productive dialogue and communication within organisations. Intergenerational staff collaboration can occasionally be challenging due to differences in habits, mindsets, interpersonal interaction styles, and technological adaptations. Young activists may leave CSOs or look for chances in other fields as a result of this generational divide.

The number of Indonesian CSOs, both registered and unregistered, has grown significantly since 1998, despite the lack of recent and thorough information. CSOs can operate in many different areas, such as advocacy, but their expansion has been primarily fueled by the inflow of foreign development aid, particularly in areas like good governance and democracy promotion.

The capacity to match advocacy themes with more recent issues, such as the climate catastrophe and elements of the extractive industry, and the availability of resources have, nevertheless, had a significant impact on this expansion. Developments in the governance and anti-corruption sectors have shown sharp disparities, even though this does not adequately account for the rise and decline of CSOs. The ability of CSOs to effectively respond has not always kept pace with sectoral urgency.

Participants in ICSF 2024 also recognised this, pointing out that despite the obvious urgency in their industries, several CSOs lack the funding necessary to operationalise innovative ideas or start programs. For a more in-depth investigation, the difficulties CSOs encounter can now be projected onto their ecosystems.

CSOs continues to document resistance and successes in support of civic space and human rights in spite of internal and foreign pressures. As demonstrated in the Wadas case, CSOs continues to assist local communities and community organisations that oppose the eviction of landowners for business or governmental purposes.

Another example is Fatia-Haris's defense against defamation allegations brought by Luhut Binsar Panjaitan. When Project Multatuli was struck by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, independent and critical online media sources worked together to keep its coverage available to readers. On August 22, 2024, large crowds protested the House of Representatives (DPR RI) Plenary Session's decision to pass the Regional Election Bill (Pilkada Bill), demonstrating that the people's opposition is still alive. Civil society preserves hope.

The concept of holistic security has drawn awareness among CSOs. The establishment of JPLKI (Jaringan Pengada Layanan Keamanan Integral/Integral Security Service Provider Network) as a collective care system addresses several holistic security challenges that most organisations cannot solve individually, including physical, digital, and psychosocial security, as well as the availability of funds to respond to human rights emergencies and protect civic spaces for activists.

Recommendation and Alternative Strategy

In general, the majority of suggestions from all rounds of ICSF 2024 are technical in character, with ambiguous wording that do not distinguish between long-term and short-term initiatives. To create a more systematic concept map, the team uses storming to group technical proposals into strategic thought clusters.

These strategic thought clusters will be used to organise recommendations and alternatives. From the clusters of ideas that arise, recommendations and alternatives may point to multiple actors, with the ecosystem's function not always solitary; CSOs, funders, firms, research institutes, universities, philanthropy organisations, and so on.

This section benefits considerably from the five scenario testing sessions held during the main round of ICSF 2024: surviving, growing, marginalised, controlled, and unexpected. However, rather than following the scenario distinction, the recommendations in this section are based on participants' formulations of potential collaborations on the five key issues of ICSF 2024, which are: countering the shrinking civic space, the situation of CSOs (capacity, technical, and funding), strengthening networks and collaboration, polarisation and discrimination, and regeneration (internal and external).

The strategy formulation in this section is based on proposals from ICSF 2024 participants with defined ideas and topics. We set aside proposals that are too ambiguous, contain incomplete sentences, cannot be confirmed and corroborated, or cannot be cross-checked. The recommendations listed below are organised based on the form of strategy and assigned to the appropriate ecosystem function. Each heading comprises technological strategies presented in no particular order.

1. Civic Space

1.1. Developing and Maintaining CSOs Consolidation

This strategy seeks to gather the strength of CSOs from various sectors and generations in order to expand civil society and mobilise support from governments, independent institutions, media, academics, and corporations. The consolidated power of CSOs is projected to strengthen their efficacy in providing checks and balances for actors in the state and private sectors. Some anticipated consolidation efforts:

- ICSF takes responsibility as organiser of CSOs consolidation.
- Designing and implementing an agenda to seize and win public space with civil society discourse through secure communication channels.
- Compiling a map of actors and their power in relevant areas for consolidation and collaboration.
- Developing and strengthening interconnected critical knowledge nodes for civil society action.
- Strengthening organic CSO networks, including on social media, through legal aid, cooperation, capacity building, community research, and knowledge exchange.

1.2. Building CSOs Capacity

In order to overcome the difficulties of funding, knowledge and analysis, advocacy and collaboration, and good governance, this strategy generally seeks to foster a critical and adaptive attitude and practice within CSOs.

- Building 'Civil Society Leadership Academy' to organise capacity building for civil society with the following themes:
 - Critical education and ideological insight for civil society.
 - Sustainability and alternative financing/funding models for CSOs (social investment, impact investment, blended finance, fundraising business).
 - Database/inventory of local wisdom to support research and development cooperation, advocacy and collaboration, good governance, alternative media, and thematic/sectoral libraries.
 - Construction of alternative organisational models to be adaptive to the actual situation.
 - Human rights, justice and gender equality (GEDSI, inclusion, intersectionality, etc.)
 - Voter and political education for young people.
 - Accompaniment and organisation of communities, marginalised groups and victims.
 - Peace and conflict resolution.
- Building community of practice by utilising organic function of CSO network and umbrella organisation.

1.3. Holistic Security

Building and strengthening the organisation's collective care policies and practices, as well as expanding the holistic security service infrastructure for CSOs, are the goals of this holistic security strategy.

- Strengthening holistic security infrastructure (collective care) at the national level with sustainable funding, and connecting to subnational networks.
- Initiating the development of holistic security infrastructure that is accessible at the subnational level (shelters, safe spaces, legal aid and paralegal, etc.).
- Helping CSOs create organisational-level collective care models for holistic security that can be replicated.
- Providing support for the preparation of safeguards and protocols for CSOs (PSEAH, child protection, etc.).
- Organising platforms for learning and reflection on the use of safeguards.
- Strengthening the capacity of CSOs for digital literacy and digital security.
- Developing CSO capabilities in the field of information technology for response and adaptation in disaster and crisis situations.

1.4. Strengthening Public Institutions

The strategy of strengthening public institutions remains important to implement with the aim of maintaining and expanding civic space, through strengthening governance, perspectives, policies, and practices of government institutions and officials.

- Advocacy encourages public institutions to perform well in specific areas identified by ICSF2024 participants, such as inclusion at the village level, village funds with a GEDSI perspective, evidence-based policy advocacy, student parliaments, and inclusive public communication through sign language classes.
- Developing understanding about diverse approaches to improve public institutions. The focus of strengthening areas must be regularly examined, updated, and altered based on the outcomes of the CSO network's risk analysis.

2. Incubation and Acceleration

Through capacity-building services offered by regional intermediaries, this strategy seeks to promote the expansion of early-phase CSOs. This means that bringing the presence of intermediaries that function as resource centres closer to the CSOs that will be served is also crucial to this strategy.

- Expand regional resource hubs to facilitate the growth of early-stage CSOs with organisational development services.
- Connect early-stage CSOs with other institutions for innovative program collaboration and financing (e.g. social entrepreneurship).
- Develop hubs for resource sharing (knowledge, small grants, etc.)

3. Public Perception

Through capacity-building services offered by regional intermediaries, this strategy seeks to promote the expansion of early-phase CSOs. This means that bringing the presence of intermediaries that function as resource centres closer to the CSOs that will be served is also crucial to this strategy.

3.1. New Narratives

- Strengthening the image of social movements and CSOs by offering new narratives and symbols that are simple and ‘compelling’ through social media networks and platforms.
- Involving mass media and journalists more intensively and consistently in disseminating information about contributions and good news from CSOs.

3.2. Fight Against Disinformation

- Collaborate with journalists, content creator communities, fact-checking and anti-hoax organisations to counter disinformation about civil society and CSOs.

4. Funding Model

This strategy aims to facilitate the identification, exploration, trialling of alternative fundraising and financing for CSOs, and to draw on collective learning to identify good practices for further development of CSO funding models.

4.1. Alternative Funding

- Finding and building alternative funding sources for the sustainability of CSOs.
- Establishing an endowment fund from non-government funding sources (philanthropy, individual donors, etc.) for CSOs.
- Partnering with professional partners for public fundraising, trialing digital or face-to-face donations, regular or one-off donations or crowdfunding.
- Exploring funding from CSR, family foundations, or corporate foundations.

4.2. Alternative Financing

Facilitating CSOs to explore new approaches to program management such as social investment, social enterprise or community investment.

4.3. Lesson Learned

- Identify pioneering organisations for alternative fundraising for CSOs learning.
- Facilitate learning forums for alternative funding and financing models.

5. Talent and Knowledge

The strategy on talent and knowledge functions targets two aspects, namely recruitment and organisational management. This strategy aims to instill regeneration and member practices within CSOs.

5.1. Activist Recruitment

- Engage grassroots, local youth, representing diverse identities through engagement in civil society movements and CSOs.
- Organise training, briefings and mentoring for young activists with themes tailored to the needs of the organisation.
- Organise reverse mentoring to close the intergenerational gap in specific areas; for example, digital/information technology, utilisation of social media for communication, networking and resource mobilisation, etc.

5.2. Organisational Management Practices

- Establishing the notion of intergenerational leadership in organisational management.
- Managing employees using professional standards and defined career and remuneration system.
- Maintaining the values of equality and democracy, mutual respect, and volunteerism in organisation culture.
- Encourage and provide opportunities for young activists to grow and accept responsibilities within organisation.

5.3. Local Context/Location and Event

This strategy seeks to increase the relevance of CSOs in its local context.

- Beneficiaries should be involved in the organisation in a meaningful way, particularly by developing community feedback mechanism.
- Periodically assess the organisation's relevance in the local context.
- Affirming the organisation's function and existence in CSO and civil society networks, as well as in the actor map of its environment.

SHRINKING
CIVIC SPACE

KULTUR

POLITIK

EKONOMI

SOSIAL

KONGKOW..

MERAWAT
DIALOG..

ANGKRINGAN..

KEBERLANJUTAN

TEKNO
LOGI..

KELENTINGAN

PETA MASYARAKAT
SIPIL

PENDEKATAN
EKOSISTEM

EKOSISTEM

KOLABORASI

KOALISI
DONASI
PUBLIK

PART 1 | INTRODUCTION

The term "shrinking civic space" refers to a deterioration in the political, economic, legal, and legislative environments that allow citizens to gather, interact, and express their thoughts, as well as act individually and collectively for civil society goals.

According to studies by Hidayat, Makarim, and Nugroho (n.d.), the European Civic Forum (2023), Act Alliance (2011), Danieri and Douglas (2009), the topic of shrinking civic space has been studied both regionally and globally for a long time. The concept is still a significant topic of discussion, according to recent studies (Bossuyt and Ronceray, 2020; Sombatpoonsiri, 2020; Strachwitz and Hummel, 2024, Sharom and Spooner, 2020).

Concern about the issue dominated all stages of the ICSF 2024 discussion, which had the official title **Fostering Dialogue, Driving Change: Indonesian Civil Society Advancing Democracy**. The focus group sessions held in Medan (25–26 June 2024), Makassar (16–17 July 2024), Yogyakarta (24–25 July 2024), and Jakarta (25–26 September 2024) revealed that the issue of shrinking civic space is diverse.

The notes gathered involve a diverse variety of actors, affect on various industries, emphasise the significance of democracy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights issues. In addition to reflecting the sense of urgency and anxiety, the three regional discussion rounds and one national event of ICSF 2024 provide civil society with an opportunity to reflect, examine past experiences and events, synthesise lessons, and engage in self-evaluation.

Alongside the aforementioned approach, a team was assigned to observe, gather information from the discussions, and compile it into a comprehensive figure depicting Indonesia's shrinking civic space in 2024. A study with such a broad issue could not reasonably overlook the legal, political, economic, and social events that took place in prior years, even though the four rounds of discussions were titled ICSF 2024.

Furthermore, political events that are evidently escalating in 2023 culminate in the parliamentary and presidential elections (February 14) and regional head elections (November 27). Furthermore, the civic space will continue to shrink beyond 2024. Over the previous ten years, signs of deterioration in the domains of politics, law, and human rights have been apparent. As a result, this group also performed library research, looked up news articles, and interviewed certain sources.

Next, to gain perspective, the team places key issues raised during all rounds of the 2024 ICSF discussions in the context of the civil society ecosystem. In this perspective, the shrinking civic space is caused by the interactions of various actors impacting one another in a dynamic sociopolitical setting.

Using an ecological metaphor, the ecosystem approach emphasises that the characteristics of CSOs are influenced by their environment, which includes culture, politics, economy, social systems, demographics, and a variety of other factors with variable degrees of influence. Similarly, CSOs may have a tremendous impact on the ecosystem that surrounds them.

1.1. Ecosystem Approach as Framework

The ecosystem approach provides a comprehensive view of civil society studies, considering the relationships among organisations, social movements, and informal networks in a complex setting, in contrast to traditional techniques that take individual organisations as the unit of analysis.

In the ecosystem model, the environment consists of regulatory frameworks, public perception, funding, talent, and civic space. This approach's holistic viewpoint helps in developing a thorough grasp of the opportunities and problems that civil society faces.

The ecosystem approach also promotes proactive and preventive activities by (a) detecting ecosystem gaps or vulnerabilities, and (b) building the foundation for the growth of civil society groups through interventions in the supporting environment.

Based on an integrative perspective, this approach also makes it easier to mobilise support for solutions suited to specific concerns in the ecosystem from actors in a larger circle. This method, which focuses exclusively on essential areas, can improve the efficiency and efficacy of intervention support.

The ecosystem approach also places a strong emphasis on collaboration and synergy. Interventions using this method benefit from collaboration across multiple ecosystem actors, leveraging collective capabilities and resources to address complex challenges.

Furthermore, the ecosystem approach focuses on the ecosystem's overall health and resilience. This strategy promotes long-term sustainability over short-term solutions that may not address the fundamental challenges in the ecosystem.

Understanding the interrelated components of an ecosystem will help in the creation of a more conducive environment for CSOs to thrive and contribute to constructive social change. As a result, this note suggests an ecosystem approach as an applied framework for building and expanding the civil society sector in a dynamic and uncertain democratic arena. This strategy will also provide a framework for responding to the outcomes of the National ICSF scenario testing.

1.2. Ecosystem, Sustainability, dan Civil Resilience

Joachim Schwarz's methodology at the Civil Society Academy International defines the civil society ecosystem through six important functions that determine civil society growth.¹ The six functions are civil society space, public perception, funding, talent and training, location and event, and incubation and acceleration. The explanation of each element is as follows:

Civil society space is concerned with the legal, political, and social frameworks required for civil society activities and organisations to succeed. VanDyck (2017) defines civil society space as "an ecosystem of organised and organic social and cultural relations existing in the space between the state, business, and family, which builds on indigenous and external knowledge, values, traditions, and principles to foster collaboration and the achievement of specific goals by and among citizens and other stakeholder."

In civic space, individuals, groups and organisations can enjoy universally recognised basic rights, namely civil and political rights, such as the right to assemble, the right to freedom of speech and right to freedom of opinion and expression. In civic space, there are opportunities for individuals and groups to be involved in decision-making, influence policy and build positive social relationships.

Public perception refers to both the reputation of civil society actors, as well as public understanding of the importance of CSO roles and structures. Reputation determines public acceptability and support, as well as the effectiveness of CSOs work. By properly recognising and controlling public reputation, civil society actors can gain public trust and support, extend their influence, and achieve their objectives. Credibility and integrity are vital in establishing a reputation.

¹ <https://www.civilsocietyacademy.org/post/an-eco-system-approach-for-civil-society> viewed December 9, 2024, 12:10 WIB

Credibility refers to the trust given in civil society actors, whereas integrity refers to consistency and honesty in their acts. This includes a track record of handling funds, transparency, and adherence to the ideas expressed.

Funding is a crucial component for civil society functions and a major concern for all CSOs. Key questions in this function include who funds which organisations, why and for what purposes, as well as emerging trends. Funding concerns the sources, requirements for obtaining it, and mechanisms for advancing the CSO's work agenda.

In recent years, the donor landscape has shifted, with institutional donors (international development agencies) and CSO donors losing relevance, while national and international philanthropy, CSR (corporate social responsibility), and public donations have gained importance for CSOs in the Global South. Impact investing is also emerging as a new funding model for CSOs.² Platforms, such as Impact Assets and Echoing Green, provide impact-based funding. Investments that take into account both profit and positive social and environmental benefits.

Talent and training. Attracting new talent is critical for organisations, as well as staff training. Schwartz (n.d.) discovered that staff development is frequently a goal for CSOs, but CSOs face capacity constraints in implementing a coherent strategy to attract and retain skilled and motivated staffs.

Jobs in the civil society sector are frequently overlooked or completely unknown, resulting in fewer high-potential individuals entering the industry. Meanwhile, in developing countries, the civil society sector competes with other sectors for qualified workers.

Locations and events. These two concepts apply to both real and virtual spaces where people can work, meet, interact, and organise relevant activities. Civil society requires a 'hang out' environment where talents and CSOs can connect to exchange ideas, conversations, partnerships, and action plans. These locations and events can considerably increase the atmosphere and effectiveness of social change initiatives, while also fighting organisational silos and egoism.

² https://investmentimpactindex-org.translate.google/impact-investing-and-ngos/?_x_tr_sl=en

This function can boost CSOs' visibility and reach to new and larger target audiences, allowing them to build closer relationships with the communities they serve. These locations and events provide other stakeholders and the organisation with broader access to resources.

Incubation and Acceleration. The purpose of this function is discussed in terms of how new initiatives or organisations can emerge and promoted, as well as how current organisations can become more effective in driving social change.

Even established organisations must innovate, widen their perspective and entrepreneurial spirit, improve their impact, and effect the social change they want. Process facilitation, leadership development, coaching, and new forms of collaboration are all approaches that can help the incubator function and accelerate social impact initiatives.


This civil society ecosystem framework serves as an analytical tool for CSOs to identify and describe the ecosystem services they are working on, why, and how. This analysis will assist CSOs in developing a picture of the civil society ecosystem in their region and throughout Indonesia, including identifying key participants who support various functions. The findings can assist CSOs build strategies for conserving and extending civic space, as well as for its long-term viability and resilience, by identifying gaps and potential for future collaboration.

1.3. Notes on Ecosystem Approach

The ecological metaphor in civil society studies appears to have emerged later, following the usage of the same analogy in business studies. Moore (1993) expressly used the phrases 'predator', 'prey', and 'ecology' in his writings on business competition; a decade and a half later, Edwards (2009) used the term 'ecosystem' in his study of civil society. Civil society ecosystems, like biological ecosystems, are complex and fragile. Their strength is based on the ties formed between elements, each with their own unique ecosystem function, that work together to achieve common goals.

According to Edwards (2009), the power of civil society can be mobilised through the linkages of grassroots groups, non-profit organisations that serve as intermediaries, and membership-based organisations that support collective goals, cross-society coalitions, mutual accountability, and learning-action exchanges. In the civil society ecosystem, no organisation can stand alone against external influences and forces.

Figure 1.3.1. Civil Society Ecosystem



Due to its complexities, the civil society ecosystem requires key processes such as collaboration, negotiation, and well-managed conflict in order for CSOs, non-profit intermediaries, mass organisations, and volunteer and grassroots groups to thrive. Intentional orchestration will direct important processes that promote adaptive capability in the ecosystem's associational life.

Furthermore, efforts to direct processes that entail various unique responsibilities held by each element of the ecosystem might help to prevent the emergence of competing processes, such as predator-prey and parasite-host connections, which are common in biological systems.

While its research has progressed more slowly than that of business ecosystems,³ the civil society ecosystem model appears to have adopted the start-up company ecosystem model with only slight modifications to suit varied contexts and subject features (see Figure 1.3.1). The civil society ecosystem model was created in response to the financial crisis and risks to the sustainability of CSOs. On the other hand, start-up business ecosystems emerge in formative environments that dictate the type and shape of support required.⁴

³ For a brief but comprehensive overview of the development of business ecosystem studies, read Anggraeni (2007). Unfortunately, comparable reading materials for the civil society sector are difficult to find. Mougeot, editor (2017) and Rangelov and Theros (2023) are both useful readings.

⁴ Amalinda Savirani contributed to this section by providing a brief review of the background and environment in which the civil society ecosystem viewpoint originated. The material is solely the responsibility of the writing team.

Table 1.3.1. Differences Between Business and Civil Society Ecosystems

Aspect	Business Ecosystem	Civil Society Ecosystem
Focus	Innovation, economic value, competition	Social change, advocacy, community empowerment
Main Actor	Companies, suppliers, customers, competitors, government regulators	CSOs, community organisations, government agencies, individuals
Main Goals	Profit maximisation, market share, stock value	Social justice, environmental sustainability, democratic participation
Process	Innovation, production, consumption	Advocacy, mobilisation, collaboration, social change
Goal Indicator	Financial performance, market share, customer satisfaction	Social impact, policy change, community empowerment

Table 1.3.1. above indicates the significant disparities between the two ecosystems, implying that the direct adaptation of the business ecosystem model to civil society has various dangers. The first problem originates from a failure to recognise the fundamental characteristics of business ecosystems and civil society.

Ecosystems in business are used to win competition --although the process is cooperative and co-evolutionary. Moore (1993) defines business ecosystems as *"..attract resources of all sorts, drawing in capital, partners, suppliers, and customers to create cooperative networks."*

In contrast, civil society ecosystems serve civil society goals such as social justice, environmental sustainability, and substantive democracy. Strategic initiatives based on the civil society ecosystem model must anticipate, moderate, or eliminate the features of commercial ecosystems.

Second, the coverage of the business ecosystem is limited by the purpose of seizing and maintaining the market. Thus, the business environment is widely utilised to prevent competitors from entering the market, and developing captive customers is critical for organisations looking to maximise revenues.

In contrast, in the civil society ecosystem, market control serves more as redistribution, strengthening, and empowering, ensuring that capacity and resources are not concentrated in a small number of civil society or CSOs.

The complementary functions between actors, as well as the development of the ecosystem through the support of the creation of new actors, are increasingly important for civil society's collective goals. As a result, predators, prey, and parasites should be unknown in the civilised ecology.

The Civil Society Academy's proposed civil society ecosystem framework might assist you grasp the complexity of the CSO operational environment. It also identifies difficulties and opportunities for growing CSOs' roles, as well as the possibility for collaboration among actors to support CSO growth and sustainability and strengthen their contribution to community development.

However, this framework has several characteristics that must be examined. One of them is that the relationships between ecosystem elements are not static. As a result, it is critical to add context in every development of its components.

This framework also does not include particular indicators for measuring the performance of its elements. Indicators from other frameworks that extend and elaborate each piece are extremely beneficial. With the correct indicators and a participative approach, this framework can provide useful information for analysis and making successful recommendations.

On a more practical level, this approach emphasises collaboration in order to foster a healthy civil society ecosystem. In complex ecosystems, this modality requires huge resources, and certain ecosystem actors may be unable to shoulder the burden and engage in collaborative activity.

Thus, efforts to develop a healthy civil society ecosystem face challenges that emerge from inside, such as declining commitment, scarcity of resources, and a lack of strategic leadership to organise the network's activity. The latter appears to be CSOs' natural role in the civil society ecosystem of Indonesia.

1.4. The Changing Landscape of Civil Society

The landscape of Indonesian civil society, which exists between the state, the family, and the business, is not static. It gradually evolves, resulting in actors who must be well identified. Some of these actors are on the border, at the intersection of civil society (as traditionally defined) and the governmental, family, and business sectors. VanDyck (2017) defines civil society space as five distinct typologies.

The five typologies are (i) CSOs, which consist of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations, and community-based organisations that have organisational structures and missions and are registered entity types; (ii) trade unions and organisations representing workers; and (iii) online activities and groups, which are social media communities that can be organised but do not necessarily have a physical, legal, or financial structure; (iv) social movements, collective actions, and/or identities, whether online or offline; and (v) socio entrepreneurs who use innovative and/or business-oriented ways to generate social and environmental impact.

CSOs in Indonesia have grown and thrived since the 1998 Reformation, focusing on topics such as governance, law reform, anti-corruption, decentralisation, human rights, gender equality, and so on, due to the openness of democracy, political systems, and participation.

People's movements also expand to express their concerns directly, with little interference from the government. Furthermore, corporate foundations or social foundations that are affiliated with or have historical roots in corporations continue to exist.⁵

The new role of the Corporate Foundation (CF) is described academically as "a public role carried out by the private sector" (Haufler, 2001). It is a new strategy for private businesses in the face of global competition, and it includes social and environmental standards, corporate codes of conduct, and monitoring systems.

In Indonesia, review of CF is more closely tied to CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), a social finance program used by corporations. CSR is frequently regarded as a type of corporate responsibility, owing to externalities resulting from corporate actions, such as environmental damage.

⁵ Amalinda Savirani's succinct remarks on corporate foundations are included in this section. The writing team is in charge of the information in this section.

Haefner identified the early 2000s as the start of the "CSR Movement" characterised by the rise of CSR practices in Indonesia. Rosser and Edwin's (2010) study, for example, showed that the regulation that resulted in CSR (Law No. 4/2007) was the result of a struggle between business actors (related to oligarchy), local communities and civil society alliances, and the interests of politicians who supported business owners, particularly in terms of voluntary rather than mandatory CSR.

Although the definitions vary, there are some basic characteristics of CF that can be identified, including: a) the existence of a crossover between the business and civil society sectors; and b) the existence of dual objectives of CF, namely social motives (socially driven) and profit motives (profit/corporate-driven).

According to organisational theory, CF's motives are a blend of those found in both social and business organisations. When there is a conflict between the two, the profit making motivation usually wins.

The expansion of CSR practices may present an opportunity for CSOs to use it to strengthen their financing portfolio. This is an opportunity, but it may also be viewed as a challenge due to the possibility of conflicts of interest and a clash of ideals. Thoroughness and cautiousness will help CSOs navigate these challenges.

In addition to the new types of foundations mentioned above, the presence of paramilitary groups is becoming more diverse and expanding along with the rise of corporate security (Aditjondro, 2004) and influence over other business entities. The emergence of state-supported foundations, namely foundations founded by state-owned corporations and functioning in the field of civil society, has also altered the contemporary civil society landscape.

Civil society space no longer refers to "the space between the state, business, and family" and is no longer used just to "foster collaboration and the achievement of certain goals" that allude to shared interests based on universal principles.

This Reflection Note focuses on the voices, demands, and interests of CSOs represented at the Indonesia Civil Society Forum (ICSF) 2024 at the regional and national levels. Participants represent several CSO typologies (NGOs, faith-based organisations, and community-based organisations).



Given that NGOs are merely a term of practice, this typology truly refers to organisations with a Foundation (Yayasan) legal entity and an Association (Perkumpulan) legal entity (KKB, 2013), which clarifies VanDyck's typology. These organisations can be classified as Grassroot-Based Movements (GBM) or Non-Grassroot-Based Movements (NGBM) (YAPPIKA, 2022).

GBM refers to CSOs with direct organising activities at the grassroots level, consisting of the established, namely those with a longer history, experience, and achievements, working on national-level advocacy with members working at the regional/local level, and the emerging, namely CSOs with a more diverse history, experience, accumulated knowledge and achievements, and characterised by direct organising at the grassroots level, may or may not have other organisational.

NGBM refers to CSOs that serve as support infrastructure for other CSOs by developing knowledge (knowledge-based) and managing and distributing donor grant cash (fund-based).

DEMOKRASI
RUANG
SIPIL
OMS
INDONESIA

KEMUNDURAN
DEMOKRASI

MENCOBA
BERADAPTASI..

OLIGARKI

NEPOTISME

WANTED!
FUFUFAPA

FUFUFAPA..

BELUM
MENEMUKAN
PETA
KOMPREHENSIF

ORMAS..

BIAS
PARTISAN



FOOD
ESTATE...

TANTANGAN..

PERLU
KONSOLIDASI
INTERNAL

PERINGATAN
DARURAT!

OMS

PART 2 | DEMOCRACY, CIVIC SPACE, AND INDONESIAN CSOs 2024

Several studies and diagnoses of Indonesian civil society over the previous decade have indicated a shrinking civic space as well as political deterioration. These studies were conducted from a variety of perspectives, including damage to political and democratic institutions (Power, 2018; Power and Warburton, 2019), the influence of interest groups competing for political and economic control (Baker, 2023), human rights violations (Hidayat and Nurdin, 2020), and the dynamics of CSOs (Setyawan and Tomsa, 2023). These studies complement one another, underlining the importance of a civil society response that includes engagement in the public sector as well as ecosystem elements.

As members of the ecosystem, CSOs are not immune to the desire to adapt to changing circumstances, particularly restrictions on civil/citizenship space that limit their movement and expansion. Unfortunately, a full map of CSO issues and options in such a large environment is difficult to locate. Reviews of the relationships between players who influence one another in the ecosystem are more commonly found in sections scattered among numerous publications.

Sinanu's study (2009), for example, focuses on the connection between Indonesian and international CSOs, which is not totally equal. Davis (2012) gives useful information on the reliance of Indonesian CSO funding on foreign donors. Meanwhile, Lassa and Li (2015) use social network theory to explain the impact of network density on CSO sustainability. Setyawan and Tomsa's (2023) literature helps us comprehend how CSOs engage within the complex network of civil society groups to adapt to changes.

To help with the presentation, this part briefly describes the sociopolitical background over a lengthy period of time, as well as the responses and dynamics of CSOs that are prominent enough to be recognised during that time. The format of this part is intended to help readers acquire perspective on the study of field findings from the ICSF 2024 discussion forums, which are equipped by materials from a variety of sources.

2.1. Democratic Backsliding

Although he is regarded as bringing optimism for a new Indonesia (Time, 16/10, 2014), President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has demonstrated alarming tendencies from his first year in office, in contrast to SBY's two steady and stagnant administrations (Mietzner, 2012 and 2014; Aspinall, Mietzner, and Tomsa, 2015; Istianto, 2014). Jokowi promised to resolve key human rights cases during the campaign, but instead restricted civil liberties by manipulating laws governing defamation, treason, blasphemy, and mass organisations (Mietzner, 2017).

Toward the end of his first term, observers highlighted how Jokowi had pushed democracy backwards (Hadiz, 2017), if not authoritarianism (Power, 2018). While protecting his political future from the pressure of conservative and hardline forces that Prabowo Subianto exploited before the 2019 presidential election (Hadiz, 2017), Jokowi systematically immobilised the pillars of clean and democratic administration. Through a coalition of supportive parties in the DPR, he subordinated the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to his supervision as part of the executive branch by revising the KPK Law.

The revision of the KPK Law represents a decrease in civil society's ability to defend democracy. The new KPK Law occurred because society is caught up in partisan politics during the election. This partisan bias is evident in the rise of civil society figures in the presidential election campaign ranks, which has put Jokowi against Prabowo Subianto since the 2014 presidential election.

Furthermore, the candidates' use of identity politics as an election political strategy has polarised civil society. Partisan inclinations that reinforce political poles in civil society have spread, weakening civil society's defense against the pressures imposed by the Jokowi administration (Mietzner, 2017; Raharjo Jati, 2022; Simandjuntak, 2021).

The dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), followed by the freezing of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), and the subordination of the student movement via university administration, all opened the ground for conservative forces to implement an anti-democratic agenda. Civil society sentiments were polarised during the breakup and freezing of HTI and FPI. Mietzner (2021) observed that several civil society members accepted Jokowi's rationale of intolerance for freezing the two mass organisations.

Immediately after his second victory over Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 Presidential Election, Jokowi then eliminated the possibility of political turmoil due to the Jokowi-Prabowo polarisation. He gave Prabowo a very strategic position in his cabinet, namely Minister of Defense. He also provided a large budget, especially for defense equipment purchases, as well as the unreasonable and foul-smelling food estate project in Kalimantan to the Ministry of Defense (Kompas, 09/01/2024). Jokowi also gave Gerindra member Edhy Prabowo, who was recently caught in a corruption case, the position of Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.



The nepotism effectively muffled criticism from Gerindra Party members who had been very loud in the DPR in the past. It marked the end of Jokowi's efforts to suppress the DPR's key opposition forces, after Golkar, PAN, PKB, and PPP formed a grand alliance with the PDIP. The partnership excluded the Demokrat Party, which opted to be 'neutral', and the PKS, which had never supported Jokowi in any election since he ran for Mayor of Solo.

Without a strong opposition in the DPR, Jokowi acts almost without supervision. His ideas, which are partially supported by legislation enacted during the legislative process in the DPR, continue to be implemented without encountering political opposition. He demonstrates the validity of Levitsky and Ziblatt's (2018) theory that democracy is eroding very slowly, almost invisibly.

Jokowi's power strengthened in 2022 when Anwar Usman, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, married Idayati, Jokowi's younger sister. Anwar Usman's intervention in late 2023 cleared the door for Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, to become Prabowo Subianto's vice presidential candidate in the 2024 presidential election by adding additional clause on candidate eligibility.

This controversy is the pinnacle of political events in 2023, justifying worries that Indonesian politics is shifting toward illiberal democracy, legalistic authoritarianism, and a variety of other labels with comparable meanings. It's no surprise that research institutions and political indicators have consistently given Indonesian democracy a low score.

Following the 2024 election, Indonesia's democratic backsliding has not slowed. At the national level, KIM is attempting to consolidate complete dominance in the DPR by bringing all major parties into the coalition. As of mid-October, only PDIP has not officially joined KIM. In addition, the large coalition at the central level is often replicated at the subnational level.

At the regional level, KIM attempts to control regional elections by creating a competition between coalition-supported candidate pairs and empty ballot boxes. Before the simultaneous regional elections in November 2024, there were around 40 governor/district head elections with only one candidate pair. The Constitutional Court's decision in case No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 has significantly reduced this number. Without it, it is projected that more than 100 provinces/regencies/cities will hold regional elections with empty ballot boxes.

Box 2.1.1. Democratic Backsliding Timeline in Indonesia 2019–2024

- 
- 17 September 2019** Law No. 19/2019 was passed by the DPR as the Second Amendment to Law Number 30/2002, which concerns the KPK. This amendment includes the KPK as part of the executive branch.
 - 5 October 2020** The DPR passed Law No. 11/2020 concerning Job Creation. This law, which claims to create jobs, was created quickly, without adequate public studies and consultations, greatly benefits business owners, harms workers, accelerates environmental damage, and is very likely to trigger social conflict.
 - 17 November 2020** President Jokowi released Presidential Regulation No. 109/2020, which addresses the acceleration of national strategic projects (PSN). It served as a trigger for long-term human rights violations in a number of national strategic projects, including Rempang Eco City and the Bener Dam.
 - 30 December 2020** FPI were disbanded under a Joint Decree (SKB) of six high-ranking state officials. The six officials are: Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian, Minister of Law and Human Rights Yasonna Laoly, Minister of Communication and Information Johnny G. Plate, Attorney General ST Burhanuddin, Head of BNPT Boy Rafli Amar, and Chief of Police General Idham Azis.
 - 29 September 2022** The DPR did not extend Aswanto's tenure as a constitutional judge. This action was taken with the idea that Aswanto was the DPR's representative in the Constitutional Court. They believed that Aswanto had hurt the DPR by frequently annulling DPR-produced laws that were subject to legal scrutiny at the Constitutional Court. Guntur Hamzah, the Secretary General of the Constitutional Court, was appointed to succeed Aswanto.
 - 21 September 2023** The Constitutional Court has issued Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023. This ruling cleared the path for Gibran Rakabuming to compete as a Vice Presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto.

Box 2.1.2. “Emergency Alert” and Opposition



Source: EAS Indonesia Concept

The Constitutional Court's (MK) decision in cases No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and 70/PUU-XXI/2024 created momentum, saving democracy from further backsliding. The first ruling altered the nomination threshold for regional elections, allowing non-parliamentary parties to nominate candidates.

The second ruling overturned the Supreme Court's finding on the time restriction for calculating candidates' ages as required in regional elections. The two judgments displeased KIM, who subsequently raced to finish the draft amendment of the Regional Election Law and submit it to the DPR plenary session.

On August 22, when the DPR's plenary session was scheduled to take place, the public reacted, strongly opposing it. In several places, they took to the streets, speaking out loudly against the authorities' aggression and the massive wave that was sweeping the DPR. The wave of protests, supported by the hashtag #PeringatanDarurat (Emergency Warning) on social media, was successful in putting an end to the DPR's political oligarchy. PDIP, the DPR's sole opposition at the time, was impotent.

Opposition is still alive. Civil society maintains hope. However, until this paper was produced, there was insufficient evidence to show how civil society harnessed the momentum of the “Peringatan Darurat” to consolidate the influence of pro-democracy activists.

The consolidation of political parties over Jokowi's two terms in office demonstrates how executive power has grown to eclipse legislative monitoring function and the rule of law.

In conjunction with the growth of executive power, Jokowi implemented ambitious economic initiatives. His conviction in developmentalism influenced Indonesia's economic policies, which aimed to stimulate maximum investment and spur economic growth.

Jokowi's investment target for 2024 is IDR 1,650 trillion (Antara, September 4, 2024). The Ministry of Investment claimed that investment realisation reached IDR 829 trillion by the end of the first semester of 2024, with a balanced composition of Foreign Investment (PMA) and Domestic Investment (PMDN), with Java accounting for 49 percent. Sumatra absorbed 17 percent of invested money, outpacing Kalimantan, home to Indonesia's new capital, which acquired only 10 percent of investment during the same period.

In addition to massively build infrastructure to mobilise products and services, Jokowi offers fiscal incentives and removes various red tape from the investment bureaucracy. Government Regulation No. 29/2024, for example, grants 2 x 95-year HGU (right to cultivate), 2 x 80-year HGB (right to build), exemption from BPHTB (Land and Building Transfer Fee), simplicity of licensing, and tax breaks to Nusantara Capital City (IKN) investors.

However, government investment in the form of large scale infrastructure has not resulted in economic growth. Several research on the relationship between toll road networks and economic growth reach inconsistent conclusions (Ahmad, 2022; Fauziah, 2022).

On the expenditure side, household consumption has been the primary contributor to Indonesia's GDP development over the last two decades. Neither government nor private spending. Ironically, people's purchasing power continues to diminish due to inflation throughout 2024, the middle class declines as some fall into the vulnerable poor group, and the manufacturing sector returns workers to unemployment.

According to Statistics Indonesia (BPS), the number of middle-class people in 2024 will be 47.85 million, an almost 20 percent decrease from 2019, the pre-Covid-19 period, when the figure was 57.33 million. At the same time, the number of vulnerable middle-class people will rise from 128.85 million in 2019 to 137.5 million by 2024. The number of poor individuals will also rise to 25.22 million, a little increase from 25.14 million in 2019.

This economic crisis has caused the strategic middle class in Indonesian democracy to dwindle. This dynamic jeopardises democracy by reducing checks and balances and decreasing civic engagement, while also creating prospects for more widespread populism and authoritarian rule.

Stagflation has clouded Indonesia's economic potential,⁶ price hikes, along with a loss in people's purchasing power, appear to be fueling the middle class's demise. The downfall of democracy will continue as long as the elements of resistance to pressure are reduced.

⁶ <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20241219155636-4-597365/gelap-begini-ramalan-pengusaha-soal-ekonomi-indonesia-2025,19/12/2024>. viewed 23 December 2024, 20:24 WIB

2.2. Civic Space Situation, Flashback

As democracy collapses, challenges to civil liberties persist in numerous forms. The forms of threats reported by The C20 Civic Space Sub-Working Group published in 2022 are still relevant today, namely: repression of peaceful expression, critical opinion, and freedom of assembly, repeated attacks, intimidation, and judicial harassment of civil society actors; legal regulations that hinder CSO activities; internet shutdowns, restricting information channels, and violating digital rights; to ignoring meaningful participation from the civil society on policy making.

According to Koalisi Kebebasan Berserikat, there were over 800 cases of restrictions and violations of the right to organise in Indonesia between 2014 and 2020 as a result of the implementation of the Mass Organisations Law. Registration, restrictions on access to resources, and stigmatisation of CSOs are three examples of abuses of the right to organise. In keeping with this, KontraS reported 167 occurrences of violations of freedom of assembly between 2021 and 2023, resulting in 712 arrests, 125 injuries, and four deaths. Freedom of assembly violations included involuntary dissolution, arbitrary arrests, and criminalisation.

The threat to civil liberties is accompanied with legal impunity, resulting in a pattern of repeated abuses. According to Amnesty International, the state has even enforced impunity during the last ten years by issuing regulations that appear to be procedural but are fact non-participatory and anti-democratic.

Power abuse resulted in a number of laws and rules that legalised repression. The ITE Law (UU ITE), the Mass Organisations Law (UU Ormas), the Old and New Criminal Code Laws (UU KUHP Lama dan Baru), the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja), the Minister of Communication and Information Regulation on the Implementation of Private Electronic Systems (Permenkominfo), the Blasphemy Law (UU PNPS Penodaan Agama), and the Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 are all examples of corruption and abuse of authority (UPR, 2022; UN Human Rights Committee, 2023).

In addition to using legal instruments and impunity, the state frequently use public discourse to repress civil society. Officials, as the major producers and providers of information, can easily stigmatise civil society as foreign stooges, threats to national stability, or destroyers of morality and traditions. The mainstream media easily amplifies these stigmas, which spread swiftly via social media.

In the previous decade, the state has utilised cyber armies, buzzers, and digital robots on social media to isolate CSOs from public support. Similarly, the state has induced fear in the population, preventing them from partaking in civil activities (Katadata, 2022).

In addition to state-dominated public discourse, the oligarchic structure of the press business restricts civil liberties (PRMedia, 2024). Since the 2014 election, mainstream media has been accustomed to providing news that supports their owners and political alliances while limiting news that is deemed detrimental. Journalists are frequently the targets of intimidation, harassment, and assault. Newspapers and television stations critical of the government may be closed, taken over, or made to change their editorial stance.

On the other hand, the government utilises state advertising to influence the media, offering financial support only to pro-government outlets. According to Reporters Without Borders' (RSF) 2022 Press Freedom Index, Indonesia's ranking has dropped from 62.90 (113th) to 49.27 (117th). Along with managing public discourse, the state regulates and restricts access to information in a variety of ways. Internet censorship, website blocking, and digital surveillance are frequently employed to regulate the flow of information.

Human rights defenders also experience a variety of pressures. From 2019 to 2023, Amnesty International Indonesia recorded 1,033 victims of hundreds of physical attacks on human rights defenders, as well as at least 182 human rights defenders who were targeted by digital attacks in 114 cases.

Auriga discovered that there were 133 Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) proceedings or threats against environmental defenders in Indonesia between 2014 and 2023. During that time, there were 82 cases of criminalisation, 20 cases of physical violence, 15 cases of intimidation, 12 cases of murder, 2 cases of property destruction, and 2 cases of immigration/deportation.

Threats against human rights defenders surged considerably from two in 2016 to fourteen in 2017, a year after the government implemented the National Strategic Projects Regulation (PSN). The number of instances increased again, from 14 in 2020 to 24 in 2021, when the Indonesian government and the DPR passed the Job Creation Law. The two regulations, the Job Creation Law and Government Regulation on PSN, were created with no public participation.

In addition to the civil liberties situation and the shrinking civic space, the legal framework does not provide appropriate support for CSOs. Indonesia's legal environment, which is one of the pillars that define the sustainability index of civil society organisations (IKOMS), received a score of 4.4 in 2019. The score did not improve four years later, reaching 4.8 in 2023 (Konsil LSM, 2024).⁷ CSOs face a poor legal environment, which includes complex and bureaucratic licensing requirements, hefty administrative reporting, and intrusive supervision.

⁷ CSOSI sustainability assessment scale; 1-3 Increasing; 3.1-5 Developing; 5.1-7 Developing. See Konsil LSM, Indonesian Civil Society Organisation Sustainability Index 2023, page vii.

Shrinking civic space caused by a lack of tolerant leadership in the state as well as a bad tolerance environment in society. In such context, cases of intolerance continue to develop. SETARA Institute found 940 incidents with 1,732 acts of violations against freedom of religion and belief.

Furthermore, SETARA discovered an increase in religious disturbances, the use of blasphemy offenses, and governmental discrimination, all of which remained high. These cases are weakening Indonesia's democracy. The Economist's Intelligence Unit classifies Indonesian democracy as faulty.

With such a situation, Indonesia's democratic reputation suffers. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) said that Indonesia's civil rights score fell from 5.59 in 2019 to 5.29 in 2023. Within the same era, Freedom House rated Indonesia's civil liberties as 32 in 2019 and only 28 in 2023. In line with the EIU and Freedom House assessments, CIVICUS rated Indonesia's civic space as obstructed for the same time, with a score of 44.

2.3. Shrinking Civic Space Pattern and The Repression of CSOs

With differing degrees of urgency, civil society in numerous countries has grown exposed to attacks, threats, and pressures, as well as legal uncertainties that should safeguard citizens. In Indonesia, suppression of civic space has become a cross-country issue, involving domestic and international CSOs, international donor organisations, development initiatives funded by foreign governments, and being discussed worldwide.

Civic space dynamics, as a democratic agenda and a space for contestation, have the potential to alter the balance of the ecosystem as a whole and influence the breadth of civic action. Actors assigned to certain ecosystem roles will adjust to changes by developing their own tactics, priorities, and working methods. On a larger scale, the dynamics of civic space may elicit responses from cross-border players such as international development agencies, donor organisations, and philanthropists (Sombatpoonsin, 2020; Sogge, 2020).

The synthesis report of Hidayat, Makarim and Nugroho for the Lokataru Foundation (n.d.), which limits the universe of civic space to three civic freedoms, finds economic inequality and oligarchy, populism, unilateralism, and radicalism among the various factors that oppress civil liberties. Although the analysis is limited, the report provides information on the most common civil liberties and the groups that are victims (See Table 2.3.1.).

Table 2.3.1. Five Major Civil Liberties Violations and Its Victims in Indonesia

No.	Violation	Victim
1.	Freedom of assembly and freedom of speech	Opposition and political opponents
2.	Freedom of religion	Religious minority communities
3.	Past war crimes and impunity	Poor and marginalised people
4.	Violence and human rights violations in Papua	Papuan pro-independence group
5.	Police crimes and extrajudicial killings	Human rights defenders

Hidayat and his friends also outlined a lengthy list of problems that CSOs working for human rights, particularly civil liberties, must confront. The list includes propaganda to discredit CSOs, attacks on human rights defenders, dissolution of mass organisations, disruption of discussion events on communism and the tragedy of 65, lawsuits against civil society activists (SLAPP), personal data hacking, and the submission of CSOs for Ministry of Home Affairs awards.

The above report is consistent with Act Alliance's previous notes. In 2011, Act Alliance recorded many sorts of attacks on Indonesian people, which were mapped alongside a number of African and Latin American countries.

Shrinking Political Space of Civil Society Action report, based on a study done in ten countries, examines the trend of civic space shortening from an institutional viewpoint, focussing on the state and democratic institutions as determinants of civic space. According to van der Borgh and Terwindt (2010), Act Alliance illustrates the mechanics of restriction seen in several Southern countries, including Indonesia (see Figure 2.3.1).

When superimposed on the Lokataru mapping results conducted by Hidayat, Makarim, and Nugroho, the pattern exhibits a high degree of consistency. Currently, the pattern can explain the mechanics of the shrinking civic space in Indonesia, but the driving forces and variables that enable the situation to exist must be described individually.

Figure 2.3.1. Civic Space Restriction Pattern in Various Countries



Source: Act Alliance, 2011

2.4. Network and Framework of CSO Sustainability

How does civil society deal with the above situation?

Despite increasing attack on civil rights, Indonesian CSOs continue to adapt to new problems and settings. In the SLAPP case involving Minister Luhut Binsar Panjaitan versus Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti (KontraS, 2023), for example, CSOs were able to capitalise on the momentum to reclaim a previously closed area for free expression.

After being acquitted of defamation and spreading false news in the dispute, Haris and Fatia, the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) won a judicial review at the Constitutional Court regarding Articles 27 paragraph (3), Article 45 paragraph (3) of the ITE Law, and Article 310 of the Criminal Code (KUHP). The Constitutional Court ruled that these clauses were unconstitutional, making the restrictions on freedom of expression feel less severe.⁸


⁸ <https://revisiuite.org/masyarakat-sipil-menangkan-judicial-review-pasal-pencemaran-nama-dan-berita-bohong/>

The success rate of such push-back methods is not high, but the ability to exploit momentum can yield positive consequences. This capacity also enables civil society actors/groups to manage crises and capitalise on opportunities when supporting political developments occur by adjusting contextual tactics and strategies.

The #PeringatanDarurat (Emergency Alert) action halted the DPR political oligarchy's efforts to pass the Pilkada Bill, demonstrating civil society's ability to construct narratives, adapt strategies, and mobilise collective action. In mature situations, disseminating the story through social media and civil society networks can mobilise collective action based on shared values and ideals, with significant influence.

Finding common ground between organisations with diverse ideologies can assist drive collective work in many situations that demand lengthier efforts, even if it does not include large masses (see Box 2.4.1. The Long Road to Advocating the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes).

Box 2.4.1. The Long Road to Advocate the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes





The success examples of change activities, even the tiny sample above, demonstrate the importance of collaborative efforts, coalitions, networks, and resource sharing in civil society. Although it is costly and difficult to secure funds, collaborative work in civil society networks has become a standard practice for both CSOs and social movements in Indonesia (Nugroho, around 2010).

Beyond routine, the CSO network provides a space for people to meet and exchange ideas and information. This space, which can be online or offline, serves to improve advocacy, mobilise collective action, increase involvement and solidarity, and broaden support at both the local and global levels.

According to the ecosystem approach, connecting CSOs to networks (network society) appears to be a means to boost CSOs' sustainability and efficacy in dealing with civic space constraints. Nugroho and Tampubolon (2007, 2009), for example, suggest that CSOs use networks as a source of power to connect social movements and influence governmental policies. The challenge is that just a few CSOs can use networks to advance their sustainability.

Lassa and Li (2014) identified many factors that allow CSOs to strengthen their sustainability through network. First, consider the role and position of CSOs inside the network. The importance of CSOs' roles and positions can be measured using betweenness centrality, which is described as a strategic position in the network that allows CSOs to exchange information and disseminate influence.

The opportunity for CSOs to gain from their responsibilities and positions are directly proportionate to network density, which is defined as the ratio of an organisation to be connected to the entire network. Furthermore, the depth and nature of CSOs relationship assessed by degree (indegree and outdegree), as an active networker, passive network member, or receiver of network influence/benefits. Lassa and Li discovered that the higher the degree of an organisation, the greater its sustainability.

Second, the typology of organisations with genuine connection contributes to the sustainability of CSOs on a variety of levels. A higher indegree score with donors in the network will boost CSOs' financial sustainability due to a strong financing portfolio. High outdegree, on the other hand, will contribute to CSOs' social capital due to the betweenness centrality they possess in their role as strategic connector within the network.

Lassa and Li's ecosystem visualisation, based on the NSSC (NGO Service and Study Centre) concept, reveals numerous key findings. They accept the dynamics of international donors' role in defining the integrity of civil society networks and ecosystems, as Nugroho and Tampubolon (2009) do. Shifts in donors' roles and policy priorities as resource hubs have the potential to destabilise the ecosystem and CSO networks. The network may fail if resource hubs collapse, but the organic dependency that arises between CSOs has the potential to save it.


Alternatively, if the network experiences shortage due to the lack of a resource hub provided by an international donor, localisation of that role should be explored. If international donors do not participate in the network, how can local CSOs serve as resource hubs? Is it conceivable for local CSOs to take over funding mechanisms that were previously managed by foreign organisations or donors? These two questions provide a starting point for investigating the challenge of localising resource centres.

In addition to its impact on CSO sustainability, it is crucial to recognise network issues between CSOs and overseas funders. According to Nugroho and Tampubolon (2009), asymmetrical relationships exist, and donor-recipient models are frequently problematic, whereas Lassa and Li (2014) discover that tensions between local and international CSO networks are more competitive --especially when they want to access the same funding sources-- and reduce the intensity, quality, and benefits that can be derived from the network.

Furthermore, both local and foreign CSOs compete in service delivery. This competition undermines the establishment of strong alliances and the consolidation of social movements. The research above views CSOs as network entities whose sustainability is determined by relationships that may be observed with various criteria.

In contrast to the analysis that considers exogenous factors to be determinants, the YAPPIKA analytical framework views sustainability as a function of the organisational machine, which includes organisational structure, governance, decision-making procedures, formal policies, and planned logical frameworks. The organisation is more than just a machine; it also has ideals, practices, connections, culture, habits, and development.

Figure 2.4.1. Capacity Level of CSOs in Indonesia



Source: YAPPIKA (2023)

The above method focuses the scope of the internal components of CSOs on organisational orientation, governance, organisational management, and program management, which will determine whether or not good performance can be achieved. Furthermore, all internal capacities and performance will influence the development of organisational sustainability.

YAPPIKA discovered, on average from repeated measurements of 75 Indonesian organisations in the period 2009–2021, the sample CSOs had a good level of capacity in the components of performance, organisational orientation, and program management, but only adequate in the components of governance, sustainability, and organisational management. The total degree of capacity also reflects the technical and functional features of CSOs that have the potential for transformational capacities (see Box 2.4.2).

Organisational management is the organisation's weakest internal component, having the lowest grade. Although not quantitative, with regression and correlation analysis, management shortcomings appear to be a burden on the organisation that must be addressed immediately in order to improve CSOs' sustainability.

Box 2.4.2. Organisational Capacity Assessment Scale



0,00 - 1,25: Bad capacity level
1,26 - 2,75: Poor capacity level
2,76 - 3,25: Good capacity level
3,26 - 4,00: Great capacity level

- Technical capacity refers to the basic foundation for a CSO to operate effectively. Its aspects include organisational orientation, organisational governance, and organisational management.
- Functional capacity refers to the ability of a CSO to run its programs and achieve its goals. Its aspects include program management and performance.
- Transformational capacity shows the ability of a CSO to adapt, innovate, and be sustainable amidst change.

Based on existing capacity, how would shocks or crises, such as the Covid-19 outbreak that occurred between 2020 and 2022, effect Indonesian CSOs?


Infid (2020) used a different sample than the YAPPIKA respondents to map the negative and positive effects of the Covid-19 epidemic on Indonesian CSOs. According to their assessment, the pandemic had a negative impact on the vast majority of the CSOs investigated (72 percent). Only around a quarter (23 percent) of CSOs reported being unaffected, and only a few (5 percent) were positively influenced. These findings provide insight into how CSOs are dealing with financial, operational, and work-related concerns that have been impacted by the crisis.

On the other hand, the 5 percent of CSOs that had a positive impact suggested that most Indonesian CSOs lacked capabilities for innovation and adaptation. This small group typically has a program that stays optimal even when it is managed online. Allowing employees to work from home makes this CSO more effective. In addition to flexible working mechanism and program characteristics, this small group has a business unit that provides funding and conducts other pandemic-related activities such as research and socialisation.

Infid also discovered that only 36 percent of respondents felt financially secure during the pandemic. They are CSOs that still rely on three factors for financial sustainability: the presence of donors, the existence of additional sources of income, and the ability to manage operating costs. The rest, with less 'mastery' of the keys, are divided into three groups: survival (11 percent), at-risk (31 percent), and critical (23 percent).

For the record, the Infid survey mentioned above was done during the first year of the pandemic. In fact, Covid-19 was still affecting Indonesia two years after the trial.

Diagram 2.4.1. Capacity and Sustainability Level of CSOs





As a result of aggregation, the low sustainability scores can be attributed to three subcomponents: resource mobilisation and mobilisation, leadership development and regeneration, and public trust and legitimacy. At this subcomponent level, public trust and legitimacy reflect functional capacity and transformational potential.

The CSOs in this study are fairly active in organising their communities, policy advocacy networks, and developing partnerships with stakeholders, including local governments. This measurement confirms Lassa and Li (2014), indicating that respondents are actively involved in networks and serve as resource centres for wider networks or ecosystems in their work areas.

However, in terms of resource mobilisation and utilisation, as well as leadership development and regeneration, CSO is facing challenges. According to Lassa and Li (2014), the majority of CSO are based on a single source of funding, typically from an international NGO, and are also supported by an international donor organisation.

They do not currently have a fundraising strategy in place to fund the organisation's overall strategic plan, and funding do not include special fundraising staff or infrastructure. While robust leadership development and regeneration occur in helped communities, very few CSOs do the same for their own organisational requirements.

REFLEKSI

PENYEMPITAN
RUANG SIPIL



KONTEKS
LOKAL

POLA REPRESI
TERHADAP OMS

KEK

PSN

PERSEPSI
PUBLIK

RESILIENSI

SPEAK
OUT!

PARADIGMA
LAMA



PELATIHAN

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PART 3 | REFLECTION ON THE FIELD FINDINGS

This section draws on significant findings from three rounds of ICSF Regional meetings (Medan, Makassar, and Jogjakarta, June and July 2024) and a national meeting (Jakarta, September 2024) as part of the Indonesia Civil Society Forum 2024. The information from the four meetings is organised into an ecosystem framework to assist us put the findings in context. To provide a clear visual representation of the important conclusions, this study draws on additional sources from the literature, news from online media, and others.

3.1. Shrinking Civic Space: Repression, Resistance, and Crisis

First report from four rounds of the ICSF show how civil society activists, CSO staff, development workers, and human rights advocates in Indonesia are under pressure and limited by the state's repressive infrastructure, which includes the military, police, and the means of violence they control. Indigenous human rights defenders and environmental activists are claimed to experience ongoing pressure and restrictions. The state's pressure, bans, and attacks on human rights activists usually result in private capital interests (Hidayat and Nurdin, 2020).

Repression against activists, development workers, and human rights defenders having a significant impact on the most vulnerable communities. The pressure and restrictions faced by activists, development and human rights workers are fundamentally a denial by the state, as the principal duty bearer, of the system of human rights protection and appreciation. In a variety of scenarios, the most vulnerable populations face direct repression and constraints.

Stories from the field reveal distinct patterns of repression in repeated forms and methods, at various periods, events, locations, and subjects.

3.1.1. Pattern of Repression against CSOs

Repressive Development called National Strategic Projects (PSN). One of the patterns discovered in field reports and statements from ICSF 2024 participants is repression in the implementation of PSN. The Jokowi government's desire for economic growth through massive investment serves as the foundation for employing securitisation.

PSN is a large-scale project package and program pattern that was planned technologically and maintained centrally. According to Permenkominfo No. 9/2022, PSN includes 200 projects and 12 programs, with a total investment value of IDR 5,481.4 trillion.

PSN's twelve projects cover toll exit access, smelters, jobs, food provision, economic equality, waste processing installations, strategic tourism locations, border areas, superhub, regional development, special economic zones (KEK), and the sugar and palm oil sectors. PSN projects include road access, dams and irrigation, plantations, trains, electricity, ports, clean water and sanitation, airports, tourism, housing, education, coastal embankments, and technology.

Align with Government Regulation No. 41/2021, this securitisation applies to various PSN facilities. This strategy is frequently used, despite the fact that Government Regulation No. 41/2021 has various provisions for managing PSN's societal impact. Unfortunately, the Ministry, Governor, and Regent/Mayor are responsible for dealing with the social impact, which is regarded as compensation or relocation of affected residents. Without environmental impact analysis (Amdal) rules, the compensation paid is ineffective in preventing conflict. When tensions build, harsh treatment is prevalent in certain projects.

Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA) reported 21 agrarian conflicts related to PSN out of 30 total agrarian conflict incidents in 2023. Several confrontations arose as a result of PSN's acceleration, including the Komodo National Tourism Strategic Area, the Padang-Pekanbaru Toll Road, the Sepaku Semoi Reservoir in the Indonesian capital city, and the PLTA in Pinrang (Kompas, 16 January 2024).⁹ As of July 2024, KPA reported 80 PSNs that have sparked agrarian conflicts.

In the Wadas case, for example, CSOs and community groups opposed to PSN were confronted with direct repression infrastructure mobilised to ensure project safety (Fuad and Kurniawan, 2024). Police and military personnel terrorised and physically attacked the local farmer community organisation (Gempadewa) --which was accompanied by WALHI, YLBHI, and numerous other CSOs-- when they rejected andesite mining on their property. Under the guise of public interest, the state frequently incites conflict between groups of people with opposing viewpoints. Amnesty International reported that groups of persons in civilian clothes regularly attacked local people who were defending their land from seizure.¹⁰

Stigmatisation/Defamation of CSOs. When confronted with criticism and resistance from civil society, particularly those working in the human rights, environmental, or anti-corruption sectors, governments frequently resort to defamation.

⁹ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/ekonomi/2024/01/15/lapar-lahan-proyek-strategis-nasional-picu-konflik>, accessed 25 October 2024, 14:21 WIB

¹⁰ <https://www.amnesty.id/kabar-terbaru/siaran-pers/hentikan-intimidasi-masyarakat-rempang-dan-stop-psn-rempang-eco-city/09/2024/> accessed 6 Oktober 2024, 08:00 WIB

This strategy was chosen to harm the reputation and validity of activists, human rights advocates, and CSOs. The allegation of 'foreign stooges', for example, is employed when the state believes that civil society pressure can be counterbalanced with nationalist enthusiasm. Furthermore, the state appears to be well aware that Indonesian CSOs rely heavily on foreign donors, cross-border CSOs, and institutional donors (**see Funding Model Section**). This circumstance is a weak spot that the state can simply exploit.

In addition to accusing 'foreign stooges', the state frequently delegitimises CSOs by raising concerns about representation, the legality of the organisation, or the goal of the action, all of which contribute to the denial of citizens' rights to gather, organise, and express their thoughts.

Another stigma stems from the tyranny of public interest, which is often used as a justification for authoritarian development. In the Wadas case, the government accused community organisations and CSOs who opposed andesite mining for the Bener Dam in Purworejo of impeding public development (Ulum, 2023; Sejarot and Halili, 2023).

In the Fatia-Haris case, for example, Minister Luhut Binsar Panjaitan accused CSOs of being a foreign stooges, utilising foreign funding for interests that were detrimental to the state, requiring an audit (CNN Indonesia, June 8, 2023).¹¹

This stigmatisation may lead the public to have an inaccurate perception of CSOs. Simultaneously, stigmatisation undermines the public's trust in CSOs. CSOs that work on sensitive subjects are frequently labelled as foreign agents or are thought that are detrimental to national interests. This view undermines public support for organisations advocating for human rights and social justice (**See Public Perception Section**).

However, civil society is not a single entity, and certain CSOs within it have failed to meet public expectations for entities that play critical roles in democratisation, human rights promotion, and justice. CSOs have recently taken on the role of advocates for accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption when the state is caught up in a corruption cycle. While these main themes are good for civil society, some CSOs engage the state through political transactions in order to reap economic rewards.

The instance of coal mining concessions for Indonesia's two major faith-based mass organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, is a clear example. In addition to reflecting the state's co-optation of CSOs, mining concessions provide a countercurrent to CSOs' decades-long environmental movement.

¹¹ <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230608163900-12-959440/luhut-saya-mau-audit-semua-lsm-dapat-dana-dari-mana> accessed 8 October 2024 01:12 WIB

In fact, NU contributed to the environmental movement by introducing environmental fiqh through KH Ali Yafie and KH Sahal Mahfudh in the 1980s.¹² Beyond its parent organisation, the Nahdatul Ulama Disaster Management and Climate Change Institute (LPBINU) has established the NU eco peace movement, which is open to activists from various parties.¹³ As expected, the mining concession caused controversy within the NU executive board and lower levels. Similar tensions existed in Muhammadiyah.¹⁴

On the smaller scale, extortion is also practiced by those who identify as CSO activists (RRI, 23 August 2024).¹⁵ Despite these problematic practices, CSOs still has a lot of opportunity to grow in terms of good organisational governance, even while anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance remain their advocacy subjects.

Physical Violence and Intimidation. Threats and physical violence are still common tactics employed by the authorities to repress civil society and its activists. The death of Sempurna Pasaribu in Karo, for example, brings to mind the murder of journalist Udin in Yogyakarta in the mid-1990s. Like Udin, Sempurna Pasaribu was a journalist who exposed military personnel's involvement in gambling in Kabanjahe, Karo, North Sumatra.

Protection International reported an increase in the number of incidences of violence against human rights and environmental defenders, from 22 in 2022 to 39 in 2023. One of the most notable cases was the murder of Gijik in Seruyan, Central Kalimantan. On October 7, 2023, he was killed in a conflict with police and troops while protesting the expansion of a palm oil plantation that endangered his land.

The military and police's involvement in horizontal conflicts between people and CSOs versus companies appears to be typical. The state's violent tools are virtually always used against the people, preferring to protect the interests of capital owners. This pattern can be seen at Rempang, Seruyan, and many other areas around Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the conflict between citizens and CSOs critical of the state, the opposite is occurring. For example, when Forum Tanah Air discussion in Kemang was dissolved on September 28, 2024, the ones facing civil society included a group of citizens (Tempo, 30 September 2024).¹⁶

The same thing happened six months ago when the People's Water Forum in Bali was dissolved. The World Water Forum's counter-activity was disbanded by a group purporting to be the Patriot Garuda Nusantara (PGN) mass organisation.

12 <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/tiga-kontribusi-utama-nu-terhadap-kelestarian-lingkungan-hidup-gxlKA>, viewed 9 Desember 2024, 16:33 WIB

13 <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/kisah-pemuda-katolik-dan-gerakan-nu-untuk-kelestarian-lingkungan-6wBsw>, viewed 9 Desember 2024, 16:30 WIB

14 <https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/ramai-ramai-internal-muhammadiyah-tolak-konsesi-izin-tambang-pemerintah-30736>, viewed 9 Desember 2024, 16:34 WIB

15 <https://www.rri.co.id/kriminalitas/899758/puluhan-oknum-lsm-diamankan-atas-dugaan-kasus-pemerasan>, accessed 31 Oktober 2024, 12:05 WIB

16 <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1922650/penyerangan-dan-pembubaran-diskusi-forum-tanah-air-di-kemang-ini-respons-komnas-ham-setara-institute-dan-lainnya>, diakses 31 Oktober 15:08 WIB

The police completely ignored the dissolution of the two forums, enabling the attacks, destruction, and violence to continue unabated. Police officers in Kemang even shook hands with members of the mob that broke into the discussion room, trashed property, made threats, and committed physical assaults. PGN rushed to dismantle PWF following a verbal plea from Bali's Acting Governor, Sang Made Mahendra Jaya, regarding the order during the World Water Forum (Tirto, May 21, 2024).¹⁷

Criminalisation and SLAPP. In authoritarian countries, legal mechanisms are instrumental. Law becomes an instrument for maintaining power. In countries with oligarchic political and economic institutions, the law is also used to defend the interests of capital owners, which are linked to the political goals of those in power. In many countries, including Indonesia, SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) are used to suppress and create chilling effect in human rights and environmental campaigners. SLAPP is an endeavour to criminalise the defence of human rights and democracy, as well as the protection of the environment.

Participation in the environmental sector has been controlled for quite some time, at least since 1982, when Law No. 4/1982 on Basic Provisions for Environmental Management was passed. There is also a current law that governs the matter, Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management (PPLH). Despite the fact that Supreme Court Decision No. 36/KMA/SK/II/2013 considers Article 66 of Law No. 32/2009 to protect environmental activists against SLAPPs, numerous environmental activists are still being prosecuted as a result of eco-SLAPP lawsuits. Auriga observed that there were at least 133 SLAPP actions between 2014 and 2023, with an upward tendency since 2018.¹⁸

Only this year did the Ministry of Environment and Forestry release Ministerial Regulation Number 10/2024, which validated the meaning of Article 66 of Law No. 23/2009. The Ministerial Regulation confirms that environmental campaigners cannot face criminal or civil charges.¹⁹ This Ministerial Regulation addresses public concerns regarding the anti-SLAPP policy under Article 66 of Law No. 23/2009, which was previously failed in preventing the criminalisation of pro-environmental activists. However, before the Ministerial Regulation of the Environment and Forestry No. 10/2024 went into effect, Daniel Tangkilisan was taken to court under the ITE Law because his social media posts about the pollution of the Karimunjawa Sea were deemed detrimental to the owners of illegal shrimp farms (Amnesty International, September 13, 2024).²⁰

Digital Attacks and Internet Restrictions. Digital technology is transforming the way authoritarian regimes operate. Instead of relying solely on the state apparatus, digital technology makes authoritarianism easier and less expensive to implement.

17 <https://tirto.id/peoples-water-forum-2024-dapat-intimidasi-dan-dipaksa-bubar-gYRq>, accessed 31 October 2024, 15:20 WIB

18 https://auriga.or.id/press_release/detail/50/status-pembela-lingkungan-di-indonesia-2014-2023-ancaman-kian-tinggi-saatnya-negara-hadir?lang=id, accessed 31 October 2024, 22:01. A very extensive summary, including an analysis of SLAPP cases in Indonesia, may be found at Protecting Activists from Abusive Litigation in the Global South and How to Respond, ICNL (2020). See also Putrijanti and Pinilih, 'Strengthening Anti-Eco-SLAPP in Indonesia', in Indreswari, Wibawa, Diaz-Granados (editor), Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Law, Economics and Governance, IWLEG 2022.

19 <https://ksdae.menlhk.go.id/artikel/12801/Perlindungan-Hukum-Bagi-Pejuang-Lingkungan-Hidup.html>, accessed 31 October 2024, 22:06 WIB

20 <https://www.amnesty.id/referensi-ham/artikel-ham/bukan-penjahat-tapi-sempat-dipenjara-kisah-daniel-tangkilisan-dan-jerat-uu-ite/09/2024/>, accessed 13 November 2024, 22:59 WIB

The state no longer relies on the military or police to spy on its citizens. The authorities can employ artificial intelligence to monitor rumours, censor figures and texts, listen in on public chats, and even deploy cyber troops to combat the opposition. Experts identify at least six characteristics of digital authoritarianism: monitoring, censorship, social media manipulation and bullying, cyber attacks, internet shutdowns, and online persecution of netizens.

For CSOs, digital technological infrastructure is a vulnerability that is frequently attacked by the state. The state has influence over the internet and telephone network infrastructure, allowing it to alter, destroy, obstruct, and even silence civil society's medium of expression and digital communications. Violence and repression in Papua, for example, are frequently accompanied by shutdowns in telephone and internet communication networks.

The Papuan civil society has been unable to swiftly report the local situation to the 'outside world due to internet shutdowns. In this situation, the state entirely controls communication with the outside world and public discourse. Clandestine initiatives have occasionally penetrated the wall, but they have always been slower than the dissemination of state-produced narratives. These constraints have slowed civic society's response outside of the location.

Papua is an extreme example compared to the situation on other islands, especially Java. However, this does not imply that civil society on other islands is capable of addressing digital flaws. CSOs do not control the infrastructure of digital technology.

Digital attacks on Indonesian democracy activists are on the rise as the 2024 election approaches. These attacks take several forms, including hacking, doxing, violations of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE), and the criminalisation of political expression. According to SAFEnet (2024), digital attacks on individuals and organisations involved in political and human rights concerns increased from 302 in 2022 to 323 in 2023, indicating a considerable rising trend throughout this political year.

Criminalisation cases in the digital spac have also increased by 15.9 percent, with over 120 people reported to the police for their online activity. In many cases, the reports were politically motivated, with the goal of silencing activists, journalists, and members of the public who expressed critics (SAFEnet, 2024).

Critical journalists and media are not immune to attack. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, the investigative journalism portal Project Multatuli (projectmultatuli.org) was targeted with a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The attack in the form of a flood of unnatural traffic/visits rendered the Project Multatuli website inaccessible to readers (cyberthreat.id, March 17, 2023).²¹

²¹ <https://cyberthreat.id/read/15463/Media-Online-Project-Multatuli-Kembali-Diteror-Serangan-DDoS>, accessed 1 November 2024, 09:34 WIB



The incident occurred following the airing of news about a child rape case in Bau-bau, Buton, Southeast Sulawesi, which was handled inadequately by local authorities. As a result of the attack, Project Multatuli website were unable to access the news article “My Two Daughters Were Molested, I Reported to the Baubau Police, and the Police Arrested My Eldest Child,” which was published on March 11, 2022. Fortunately, collaboration between online media outlets known for their critical and independent reporting allowed the news to be read on Kumparan (kumparan.com), Tirto (tirto.id), Mojok (mojok.co), and several more websites.

In addition to Project Multatuli, various critical mass media outlets have faced digital attacks. Tempo, which publishes Tempo magazine and Koran Tempo, Tirto, which specialises in data journalism, Konde, Magdalene, and Liputan6 have all faced criticism. The Tempo website's homepage was previously blocked in black, with additional red writing saying “hoax”. Tirto's post on the role of intelligence agencies during the Covid-19 outbreak was removed from their website.²²

In addition to the media, digital attacks have targeted individual journalists, activists, and intellectuals. The editorial staff of Narasi Newsroom, activist Ravio Patra, and professor and public speaker Bivitri Susanti lost access to their social media accounts, which they frequently utilise for communication. A lot of other activists reported the same thing.

So far, the hacking and digital attack instances have been settled only by their social media teams or by submitting appeals to social media platforms. Victims' reports to the police have never gotten a full response. The authorities have never settled cases involving hacking and digital attacks on citizens.

Administrative Control. Administrative control and restrictions on CSOs, as opposed to physical violence, threats and intimidation, criminalisation, and SLAPPs, appear to be long-term in nature. As a long-term tactic, administrative control has less effects than more violent methods. However, the public often accepts administrative constraints as fair control rather than repression. They are put in place to govern the operational standards and regular behaviour of CSOs. As a result, administrative restrictions are less likely to elicit backlash.

For example, the Mass Organisations Law requires mass organisations to register in order to be recognised by the state. Then, the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 57/2017 on the Registration and Management of Mass Organisation Information Systems (Siormas) strengthens the registration rules. As a result of the Mass Organisations Law, the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation emphasises that CSO registration is not optional.

²² For a case summary including first-hand interviews involving digital attacks on mass media, please read Masduki, silakan lihat Masduki, “Cyber-troops, digital attacks, and media freedom in Indonesia”, Asian Journal of Communication, 15 June 2022.

The regulation requires CSOs, whether incorporated or not, to have hierarchical administration via regulations on reporting the CSO's existence to the National Unity and Politics Agency (Bakesbangpol), both at the provincial and regency/city levels. According to Koalisi Kebebasan Berserikat (2020), 324 activities, or 33 percent of those under the Mass Organisations Law, required CSOs to register in order to receive a Registered Certificate (SKT).

The SKT itself has a dual purpose. In addition to fulfilling administrative purposes, the SKT is used for supervision, control, and resource access (KKB, 2020). Without the SKT, CSOs may face a range of dangers, including a lack of access to resources such as finance, public facilities, information and research services, demonstrations or peaceful actions, and an increase in CSO capacity and empowerment.

One of the potential risks that has been identified is the development of the Foreign Mass Organisation Supervisory Team (TPOA). This team is dominated by a combination of political and security elements or instruments, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, police, military, prosecutors, and intelligence services. Foreign CSOs operating in Indonesia must go through TPOA's screening and authorisation process.

This control system relies heavily on TPOA. TPOA examines, monitors, and evaluates proposals presented by CSOs for funding schemes. TPOA typically strives to ensure that funds entering Indonesia are used for the declared purposes, do not clash with national interests, and adhere to applicable laws and regulations. In practice, the government frequently uses the TPOA to restrict the movement and activity of Indonesian CSOs. Worse, TPOA is being used to spy on CSOs.

3.1.2. Resistance and Crisis on CSOs

In a stressful environment, Indonesian CSOs encounter a number of internal issues. Some of these problems, the ICSF 2024 participants admitted, limit their ability to respond to continuous state pressure.

Moving away from Grassroots. Participants expressed self-criticism about the increasingly strained relationship between CSOs and grassroots communities. This poor connection has made CSOs less sensitive to grassroots problems. Furthermore, in a variety of situations, CSOs facing crises or pressure are unable to organise grassroots community support to address their challenges. This component also becomes problematic when CSOs experience a regeneration issue (**see Talent and Training section**).



This tendency does not arise on its own, but rather in connection with the implementation of bureaucratic working styles and different standardised procedures in CSOs operations. Regulations that alter how CSOs interact with the state and with third parties are one of the motivators. Transparency and accountability rules, for example, push CSOs to institutionalise and bureaucratisate through more systematic structures, hierarchies, and working methods (Lay and Eng, 2020).

The same process is also driven by foreign donors whose finances are derived from taxes. Although implementation varies, bureaucratisation, administrative regimes, and accountability distinguish organisations from communal in nature, which has basic and informal structures and governance.

The next factor is the decision to use a technocratic approach to influence government policy. CSOs with great visibility among government policymakers are typically led by staff or activists with political influence, specific skills, or substantial academic accomplishments.

With the ability to participate in public policy discourse, people can influence resource allocation and distribution in government policies. These activists emerge throughout time, having extensive expertise working with grassroots communities.

Concerns about CSOs moving away from the grassroots appear to need more investigation. The rise of CSO elites who can influence public policy through technocratic and academic approaches is a common occurrence. In fact, the technocratic approach requires the involvement of CSO elites to ensure that public policy serves the interests of the people while remaining within the frameworks of democracy and human rights.

The response to the rise of the CSO elite should be more sensible and not dominated by excessive anxiety. Furthermore, the technocratic approach requires a political counterweight to prevent elite bias in policymaking. Community-based CSOs, such as farmer organisations, fishers, women's groups, disability and gender minorities, are required to influence policy via political channels.

CSO elites and community-based CSOs should work together as democratic agents. Concerns regarding CSOs moving away from grassroots communities appear to stem from a disconnect between the two actors.

However, the criticism may indicate that as more CSOs seek assistance from institutional donors, they get disassociated from their original constituency, and their structures become more formal, bureaucratic, and hierarchical. Although not yet methodologically measured, this trend poses a dilemma given most CSOs rely on foreign donors, have insufficient financial capability, and are locked in traditional modes of working.

Lack of Collaboration Initiative. How large is the CSO population in Indonesia? So far, no source has provided data on this. Several regional office websites of the Indonesia Statistics (BPS) list a number of registered CSO figures, but only for the relevant districts/cities. The BPS does not have official data, whereas the Ministries of Law and Human Rights and Home Affairs each have their own. According to Smeru's regularly updated NGO data collecting page, the most recent data collection form filled out by a CSO was on February 5, 2024.

Smeru was only able to discover approximately 1,650 CSOs out of a total of 33 pages, with an average of 50 each page. The basis and method of recording differ across Kemenkumham, BPS, and Kesbangpol in the regions, as well as Smeru, making an accurate census of Indonesian CSOs nearly difficult. Furthermore, it is impossible to establish a full mapping of CSO collaboration.

Although it does not directly explain the number of collaborative projects or programs, NGO Aid Map data depicts the number of active projects from 2000 to 2018 as a hyperbolic function, peaking in 2014. In the same year, CSOs in Indonesia had a parabolic peak.

Several analysis indicate that the phenomenon is linked to Indonesia's status as no longer a low-income country, as well as shifting global concerns such as good governance and the climate disaster. Fluctuations in financing amounts and sources have an impact on the lives of CSOs, as well as how they operate. Unfortunately, more recent data is difficult to find.

The question is, how many CSOs exist, and how many collaborative initiatives or programs have been implemented during the last five years? This subject is difficult to address due to a lack of numbers, but worries regarding the behaviour of CSOs working independently with minimal collaborative practices were raised in the ICSF 2024 discussion forum.

Box 3.1.1. SAKA: Aceh Anti-Corruption School



As the politics of donor funding evolves, many Indonesian CSOs have switched their themes and areas of focus. However, there are still CSOs that are devoted to the mission and areas of focus they have established since their founding. One of them is Gerak Aceh.



Gerak Aceh, which was founded in 2003, expanded its reach throughout a period of ups and downs for the anti-corruption CSO by founding SAKA (Aceh Anti-Corruption School) nearly 15 years ago. SAKA is an example of CSO activity that thrives on tenacity and the capacity to leverage theme collaboration network.



Gerak Aceh, which was initiated during the thriving anti-corruption program financing phase that gave rise to the national Anti Corruption Movement (Gerak) network, continues to thrive in both local and national networks. They are associated with Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and the Setapak Program for anti-corruption monitoring and education at the national level.



Gerak Aceh in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Province collaborated with SoRak in Banda Aceh and MATA (Masyarakat Transparansi) in Meulaboh (West Aceh) to carry out various anti-corruption actions. Furthermore, they were successful in convincing the NAD Provincial Government to fund SAKA's development.



SAKA, which has the legal status of non-formal education (Pendidikan Luar Sekolah), has its own building that was built on Gerak Aceh's waqf land with funds from the NAD Provincial Government budget. The land acquisition appears to be Gerak Aceh's attempt to keep SAKA independent from the influence of the NAD Provincial Government.



Under Mahmudin's leadership, SAKA has graduated almost 400 alumni from ten batches. They come from a variety of backgrounds, including government officials, judges and prosecutors, and activists. Regular lessons, lasting six to twelve months, follow a curriculum that has been regularly developed.



"Some of Gerak Aceh activists are SAKA alumni," said Destika Gilang Lestari, who represented Gerak Aceh at the 2024 ICSF Regional in Medan. SAKA alumni are scattered across many organisations. Gerak Aceh reaps the benefits of their organic labor in the shape of youth members and activists who contribute to the anti-corruption fight in NAD Province.

The individualistic approach appears to explain the collapse of CSOs forums in some areas. These forums serve as a venue for the consolidation and orchestration of CSOs collective labour in a single geographical location, under fairly genuine leadership. However, having a big number of forum members does not always imply support for a mutually reinforcing network. The majority of members do not consider the network as an opportunity to invest social capital or benefit from links with other organisations (Lassa and Li, 2015; Chandrakirana, Perdana, Andriyanti, 2020).

The forum --whose mandate was casually defined-- was incapable of facilitating member collaboration, either systematically or accidentally. As a result, members tended to operate independently, not utilising the network infrastructure. At the same time, the network's insufficient capacity prohibited it from playing a strategic leadership role in the consolidation of its member CSOs. When the network is collapse and CSOs lack the space and chance to connect, it will be difficult to respond to the shrinking civic space effort as a collective agenda.

Second possibility, the civil society ecosystem does not provide many funding opportunities for CSOs. Indeed, there is a declining tendency due to shifting financing politics and donor objectives (Davis, 2020). With limited financing portfolios and a reliance on overseas donors, CSOs must work harder to maintain access to funding sources.

This position forces CSOs to become more competitive, in addition to being more creative and innovative, in order to keep or expand their access to international donors. With limited financial resources and a strict funding model, individualistic and competitive mindsets are viewed as inherent modes of survival.

Holistic Security. The concept of holistic security evolved after the Cold War, leading to the extension of human security in development discourse. Human security, as an integrated concept, runs counter to the national security approach that many countries adopt in international disputes. Human security changes the focus of security from governments to individuals and communities, emphasising the protection of human life from both conventional (such as war) and non-traditional challenges such as poverty, disease, and environmental degradation (Pathak, 2013).

While holistic security takes a complete approach to security, it covers all aspects of human life, including physical, social, economic, and environmental. Although complementary, certain fundamental contrasts between human security and holistic security can be identified, as shown in Table 3.1.2.1.

Table 3.1.2.1 Differences between Human Security and Holistic Security*

Aspect	Human Security	Holistic Security
Focus	Human well-being in global level	Organisational and individual security
Scope	Broader, covering various threats to human life	More specific, focus on threats to individuals and organisations
Approach	Preventive and proactive	Risk-based and proactive
Implementation	Requires international cooperation and systemic change	Applied to both organisational and individual levels

**From various sources*

Unfortunately, the issue of holistic security did not discussed extensively during the ICSF 2024 session. A group discussion on this theme at the Medan regional gathering only briefly touched on the question of holistic security as part of the civic space discussion. The thoughts that emerged appeared haphazard and unclear.

This is unsurprising given that the issue of holistic security has not been frequently discussed among Indonesian CSOs. Although the UN General Assembly issued the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders about 30 years ago, its derived ideas and practices have not grown widespread among Indonesian CSOs.

Case studies, articles, brochures, and modules created by Indonesian authors or organisations are similarly in low supply. However, the discussion material on civic space --particularly attacks on human rights and environmental defenders-- raises concerns about the gravity of this overall security issue. This urgency is addressed by the Integral Security Service Provider Network (JPLKI), which shares a secretariat location with the Tifa Foundation in Jakarta.

Despite using the term 'integral' rather than 'holistic', JPLKI appears to be referring to the same concept, or at least a significant overlap with holistic security. At least, depending on the services it offers, JPLKI utilises the term 'integral' to refer to interrelated physical, psychological, and digital security. The Tactical Technology Collective (holistic-security.tacticaltech.org) uses the term comprehensive security, which has the same scope.

In a holistic security training manual developed with support from the European Union and Hivos, the TTC defines holistic security as an approach that “..rather than looking separately at the importance of our digital security, psycho-social well-being and Organisational security processes, it attempts to integrate them and highlight their interrelatedness.”²³

The holistic security concept, proposed by Barry and Nainar (2008) and cited by numerous authors (Bennet, 2015; Chamberlaine, 2020; Dordevics, 2020), covers the same broad range of security concerns as the definition of human rights defenders. However, how and at what level should the protection infrastructure for human rights advocates be implemented? Is there a clear scope for multiple types of well-being so that the burden of providing integrated security services can be distributed across areas (national and subnational) or entities (networks, organisations, and individuals)?

One of the barriers to achieving holistic security is the belief that human rights workers must work till the 'last drop of sweat' for a worthy cause. According to Chamberlain (2020), human rights defenders may face burnout due to the cultural norm of self-sacrifice, which contradicts the concept of holistic security. CSOs that embrace the concept of holistic security must counteract this misconception by creating an environment, infrastructure, and policies that ensure human rights defenders and activists are physically and mentally healthy while working.

However, major CSOs continue to struggle with holistic security, while others continue to rely on their staff and activists to manage their own holistic security challenges (self-care). Although established CSOs can provide suitable facilities, surroundings, and policies, many other CSO staff and activists labour under pressure without access to internal protection and relief mechanisms.

What CSOs do in JPLKI as a collective care system can address several comprehensive security concerns that most organisations cannot tackle on their own. With an inclusive definition of human rights defenders, JPLKI services are accessible to CSO activists from a variety of backgrounds.

²³ <https://holistic-security.tacticaltech.org/introduction.html>, viewed 21 November 2024, 19:12 WIB



JPLKI's supporters include network organisations such as the Journalist Safety Committee, WALHI National Executive, and the National Committee for Agrarian Reform. It is practically impossible for them to turn down activists who require comprehensive security assistance. Furthermore, JPLKI houses other organisations such as Amnesty International, Protection International, the Digital Defenders Partnership, and SAFEnet, all of which are accessible to a wide range of activists.

JPLKI, whose members are significant CSOs based in Jakarta, requires regional infrastructural support, particularly for physical security and legal help. This regional infrastructure would improve the agility of holistic security services, which are critical in the context of an archipelagic country.

CSOs' holistic security challenges cover a wide range of dimensions, including protection systems against intimidation and physical attacks, incentive and reward systems, social and health security, humane working hours, holidays and leave, self-development facilities, and many others. With such breadth, it is apparent that holistic security is integrated into the organisational framework in order to create a collective care system. The foundation of this concept is the institutionalisation of self-care (Chamberlain, 2020).

The issue is that CSOs may find it difficult to establish a collective care system within their organisations. Despite appreciating the necessity, some local CSOs with limited capacity may encounter challenges at the outset, such as remuneration and social security for employees in accordance with employment standards. According to the salary of their top officials, worldwide and domestic CSOs that have succeeded in collecting public donations appear to be able to exceed that benchmark (Tempo, July 28, 2022).²⁴ On the other hand, freshly emerging CSOs may not yet have created standards for staff management, remuneration, and incentive systems that address overall security concerns. This group looks to represent the greatest segment of the Indonesian CSO population.

Organisations cannot solve all holistic security challenges by themselves. Challenges that require highly specialised infrastructure and competencies appear to be best provided by networks or other organisations. Advocacy organisations or networks can provide legal aid to human rights defenders and victims of violence.

Women's Crisis centre can provide shelter to women who have been victims of violence. Health care for victims of violence can be obtained from hospitals or clinics that have proper precautions. In terms of digital security, organisations like SAFEnet may be able to assist when human rights activists face cyberbullying, account hacking, or have their identities leaked to the public to provoke negative responses from netizens.

²⁴ <https://www.tempo.co/infografik/infografik/besaran-gaji-petinggi-act-dan-potong-donasi-908>

3.2. Local Context/Location and Event

An CSO's ability to adapt to ecosystem dynamics determines its sustainability and failure. Adaptation is the process of determining a fit between the manner of working, the themes being addressed, and the interactions with other organisations in the local area.

Successful adaptation increases the likelihood of CSO sustainability as well as its relevance in the social and cultural contexts in which it operates. Unfortunately, ICSF 2024 participants had minimal discussion about how CSOs influence and adapt to different social and cultural environments.

Self-criticism of CSOs' tendency to be elitist and ignore grassroots people is mostly dependent on local environment. CSOs with a mandate to empower or organise farmers may seek to include local farming communities as constituency.

However, an organisation does not always follow its mandate. CSOs may adapt their strategies, become more visible, adopt a technocratic approach in order to connect with the government, or face logistical and financial challenges.

This technocratic way of working of CSOs, while risky, is valid as a type of citizen involvement. First, consider elitist bias. CSOs that are not directly affected by policies and repression maintain a biased view of the situation in grassroots communities. This prejudice will be carried over to a more strategic level, including policy lobbying and alternative options.

Second, the technocratic approach argues that knowledge is a luxury of the academic world, campuses, technocrats, officially educated individuals, bureaucrats, and CSO leaders. Meanwhile, grassroots communities, which go through the entire process studied and championed by CSOs, are not deemed competent learners. From this technocratic approach, CSOs fail to recognise grassroots communities as agents of knowledge reproduction.

They are not yet perceived as empowered and capable actors who can speak for themselves. The technocratic approach does not fundamentally improve power distribution in the ecosystem of civic involvement (Orr, 2007). Awareness of this gap marks the start of an endeavour to dispel the myth that grassroots groups are helpless by demonstrating the efficacy of indigenous knowledge in lobbying.



However, local knowledge does not have to be viewed as the polar opposite of academic knowledge. The two categories do not exclude one another, but rather operate in separate areas. The presence of players with diverse knowledge, both indigenous and academic, requires compromise rather than contestation. At this point, change requires actors who can bridge the gap between the two disciplines while linking parts that support each other.

Other criticisms are based on the lack of CSO collaboration initiatives, individualistic inclinations, or the low degree of most CSOs in the network. However, what happens if the network that serves as a container for CSO contact fails or ceases to function?

In some cases, the individualistic approach of CSOs can result in a silo effect; capacity, knowledge, and resources are not managed synergistically, therefore they do not provide benefits that extend beyond the boundaries of the organisation. Furthermore, quitting the network diminishes the likelihood of organisational sustainability. Ben Davis' (2020) research, for example, demonstrates that Indonesian CSOs that participate in networks have greater access to resources.

In the network model, having access to resources implies increasing indegree; CSOs benefit from their participation in the network. Meanwhile, active donations to the outdegree network are investments in social capital that improve CSO sustainability and resilience.

The network that facilitates CSOs interaction is essentially a mechanism to sustain the civil society ecosystem through symbiotic relationship among actors. As a result, the symbiotic interaction can be sustained for a longer period of time as the network persists. Unfortunately, the regional discussion round of ICSF 2024 disclosed information concerning the collapse of the network required by CSOs. The network is today required not only for planned sustainability enhancements, but also for casual and non-programmatic exchanges amongst CSOs.

In Yogyakarta, for example, the NGO Forum had stagnated for some time, leaving a void that was not filled by other networks. Recently, a group of CSOs in Yogyakarta convened and began to revive the Yogyakarta NGO Forum. Something similar occurred in Makassar with FIK Ornop, which was able to survive the period of donor support hiatus.

Despite its low level of bureaucracy, the institutionalised CSO network provides a space and site for conversation, idea and resource exchange, and learning. However, maintaining and sustaining this symbiosis is not simple. The declining role of regional CSO forums appears to be driven by technology advancements, particularly the internet and digital communication technologies.



The good news is that numerous NGO forums, including FIK Ornop in Makassar and the Yogyakarta NGO Forum, are beginning to resurface. In this case, their presence may still need to be demonstrated through the influence they wield over civil society at the local level.

Nonetheless, their presence and strategic role can be enhanced if they can form mutually beneficial relationships with resource hub or clearing house organisations such as Bakti, Gemawan, KKI Warsi, or Rumah Inspirit.

The internet and digital technology transform local contexts and locations into something virtual. CSOs with physical facilities limited to a specific geographic area can communicate with other organisations outside of those limitations. The depth of CSO's relationship with organisations in digital world creates a new notion of the local context.

The traditional concept of local context --the social, cultural, and political environment and actors within a certain geographical boundary-- is no longer adequate in the digital age. The breadth of the concept is broadened, and the causes influencing CSOs may be well outside their geographical reach. Digital world allows for faster mobility and movement than physical space does.

In the digital age, CSOs are not the dominating players who set the rules. There are states with the authority to manage the internet backbone, commercial access providers, identifiable or anonymous actors, and actors using bots and artificial intelligence. With these actors, the digital world is a contested domain where they can compete for discourse and influence public opinion.

As a result, CSOs must expedite their adaptation, occupy digital space, and create countercurrents and narratives to counteract the narratives provided by the state.

CSOs' hesitancy will bolster the dominance of the state and other actors whose interests are opposed to civil society. Because digital infrastructure is highly accessible to the general public, CSOs must invest in their discourse ability while also developing a framework to protect against digital threats.

3.3. Public Perception

As a contested space, civil society and other actors compete to control discourse, win narratives, and shape ideas and perceptions, all of which influence the nature of interaction between actors. In Indonesia, the media and social media are the most important platforms for discourse.

With an oligarchic industrial structure and a mix of business and political interests among capital owners, the media frequently becomes a mouthpiece for partisan interests, abandoning its role as the fourth pillar of democracy. At times, the mass media bombards the public with information produced by the state, promoting a specific narrative.

The media becomes a mouthpiece for the government, the ruling regime, or the interests of capitalists. The media also spreads the stigma associated with CSOs through various narratives.

Although public perception of CSOs remains relatively positive (Konsil LSM, 2024), it is not consistent. Similarly, the state's stance towards civil society. In certain sectors, such as empowerment, equality, and women's rights, the presence of CSOs appears to have had a positive impact on society and government organisations at all levels.

Offices and ministries concerned with women and children are accustomed to collaborating and discussing with CSOs active in that sector. Konsil LSM also took note of the government's positive response in the procurement and governance sectors.

In a broader sense, the Konsil LSM report is noteworthy; the government is open to collaboration with CSOs in the governance sector, whereas BPS (2024) data show that Indonesia's corruption perception index (CPI) and anti-corruption behaviour index (IPAK) have stagnated and worsened.²⁵

Several research questions could be developed from here, to look deeper into what happened to the collaboration, or to assess the influence and relationship between CSO-Government collaboration on CPI and IPAK. However, this note will not go into further detail about these issues. Furthermore, CSOs must assess the risks of social media penetration and the state's proclivity to use it to control discourse, shape opinions, and manipulate citizen behaviour.

²⁵ <https://www.bps.go.id/id/pressrelease/2024/07/15/2374/indeks-perilaku-anti-korupsi-ipak--indonesia-2024--sebesar-3-85--menurun-dibandingkan-ipak-2023-.html>.

According to Koran Tempo's report (November 18, 2024), the government intentionally used social media platform X.com to connect with citizens. Although no reason was given, it appeared that the government chose the platform based on its user profiles and used them to capture public discourse.

For quite some time, the narrative of CSOs as agents of other countries' interests has circulated in the public space. The government levelled this accusation against critical CSOs and activists. As in Zimbabwe, Hungary, and Russia, the accusation is political. However, the state can create a special administration to limit CSO access to foreign funds due to security and sovereignty threats (Chaudry, 2020; Kreienkamp, 2017). It is difficult for CSO to fight this accusation. In addition to being political, with no factual support other than prejudice and insecurity, this accusation has the potential to spark controversy and provoke cyberbullying.

Another narrative emerged, claiming that CSOs survive by selling poverty. This narrative coexists with the perception of CSO as a foreign stooge. Although it has received widespread attention from CSO circles (Konsil LSM, December 4, 2008),²⁶ the accusation remains alive years later (delegasi.com, March 7, 2017).²⁷ This narrative emerged when CSOs gained access to foreign funds to fund their organisations and programs between 2000 and 2010, when transparency and accountability became major themes accompanying donor financing.

When CSOs advocated for the issue of corruption passed down from the impoverished New Order, the public reacted negatively. According to Petras and Veltmeyer (2002), a study found that CSOs at the time served as agents for the commodification of poverty rather than fighting for democratisation and human rights goals (Assa'di, Dharmawan, & Adiwibowo, 2009).

Deviant behaviour in people with the CSO identity, on the other hand, contributes to the stigma of CSO as extortionists (Kumparan.com, 27 September 2018; Fajar.co.id, 20 January 2023).²⁸ All of these narratives and stigmas harm CSO's reputation as an agent of development and democratisation in the eyes of the public, particularly in layers that are not directly involved in the program or benefit from CSO's work.

While CSOs do not intentionally cultivate positive public perception, the accusations made above are part of the facts about CSOs. In some cases, CSOs is seen to create conditions that promote stigma against itself.

26 <https://konsillsm.or.id/akuntabilitas-lembaga-swadaya-masyarakat-beberapa-observasi/>, accessed 30 October 2024; 23:12 WIB

27 <https://www.delegasi.com/gubernur-lebu-roya-minta-lsm-tidak-menjual-kemiskinan-ntt/>, accessed 31 October 2024, 00:06 WIB

28 <https://kumparan.com/redaksiportalmdura/aksi-palak-kerap-terjadi-mahasiswa-tuding-oknum-lsm-melenceng-dari-tupoksinya-1538048383306200409/1>, accessed 3 November 2024, 18:24 WIB and <https://fajar.co.id/2023/01/20/tujuh-oknum-lsm-tersangka-pemerasan-dalam-kasus-pemerkosaan-di-brebes-resmi-ditahan-politisi-pkb-preman-tukang-palak/>, accessed 3 November 2024, 18 24 WIB.

Poor governance, disobedience to organisational mandates, opportunistic resource and organisational sustainability decisions make it easy for CSOs to lose their standing in front of corporations and the state. In conflict situations, in the digital and post-truth eras, states with cyber troops or buzzers can easily provoke counterattacks against CSO campaigns or advocacy efforts. With 169 million active social media users, some of whom behave impulsively and aggressively, social media manipulation is a factor that can harm CSOs (Masduki, 2021).

With an inferior position in public discourse and the media, CSOs must find the best communication strategy to protect their reputation and improve public perception. While continuing to promote critical thinking about development, human rights, and democracy through criticism and advocacy of state policies and their implementation, CSOs can enrich public discourse with data on tangible and easily identifiable changes. The deficit in this sector, while not yet well measured, must be addressed immediately to prevent the negative narrative about CSOs from spreading without a counterbalance.

The fact that institutional donors and international development agencies continue to cooperate demonstrates that CSOs are highly effective alternative development partners. This donor trust can be used to improve the reputation of CSOs while increasing public support. Following years of CSOs giving it to donors, the issue of public accountability must also be handled well, particularly with constituents.

Being responsive to constituent concerns, involving them in change efforts, and being open to constituent scrutiny can all help CSOs gain public support. As a result, this transparency and accountability will build trust among donors, who are also interested in the success of their programs in collaboration with CSOs.

3.4. Funding Model and Financial Resilience

Dependency and Capacity Deficit. CSO funding became a major theme at ICSF 2024, particularly in regional forums. According to the mapping of ideas circulating in the discussion, the funding issue was like a knot that blocked the way out of various CSO challenges in maintaining civic space. The assumption in the discussion was that the availability of funds would open up numerous opportunities for CSOs to function more effectively in the civil society ecosystem. In fact, the ability of CSOs to access funds from outside sources in quantities that exceeded their management capacity sparked opposition from critical nationalist groups (Eldridge, 2005; Konsil LSM, 2007).

From this point, the map of CSO funding issues does not appear to be converging. The components of the problem are in conflict with one another, demonstrating the multifaceted nature of CSO funding issues. New CSOs founded by experienced staff and activists may inherit the goodwill, reputation, and social capital of their predecessors, as well as the networks they bring, making it easier to access funding sources. However, CSOs in their early stages of development, lacking a legacy of social capital, working alone, and not yet connected to support networks, may face financial constraints.

CSOs face challenges in implementing programs and realising their vision due to their limited funding portfolio and lack of experience. The burden and cost structure of CSOs make the organisation's sustainability agenda as urgent, if not more so, than achieving its vision. While foreign donors remain the primary source of CSO funding (Davies, 2020), their funding policies appear to need to take this into account.

Donors must recognise the diverse capacities of CSOs in accessing funding sources and tailor their funding policies accordingly. Certain donors may have key, favourite, and trustworthy partners who receive financial support with only minor conditions. Other donors prefer to work with development contractor partners who have large financial portfolios and administrative capacity to fund large-scale programs in the name of efficiency.

Other donors prefer to collaborate with intermediary organisations that serve as focal points, or grantees who manage medium-scale program funds for redistribution among sub-grantee CSOs at the regional level. There is plenty of room for donors to find CSO funding schemes that address the challenges facing the Indonesian civil society ecosystem.

As a social fact, donor dependence is a symptom of several CSO vulnerabilities. First, CSOs have a limited ability to secure alternative funding sources. Simultaneously, piecemeal and short-term donor support indicates that most CSOs' capacity remains below the level desired by donors before providing longer-term and larger-volume support. Furthermore, some donors are only able to support short-term programs.

Donor dependency also exposes CSOs to changes in financing politics and development priorities. Changes in donor themes, geography, and geopolitical policies at the regional and international levels have a direct impact on grantee CSOs.



Changes in theme, even if other parts remain unchanged, may lead CSOs to compromise their vision and mission in order to maintain organisational continuity. CSOs who follow this inclination run the risk of becoming caught up in mission creep, which is a progressive movement from the organisation's initial objective to an uncertain future. In the context of the ecosystem, this condition may result in an empty civic space that anti-democratic actors will take.

CSOs that have reached stability (established) in their funding portfolios are able to drive more planned changes, expand, build networks in other areas, diversify, create subsidiary organisations, and form conglomerates (Ogliastri and Flores, 2008). At this level, BINGO CSOs enjoy a strong bargaining position with donors. Ogliastri and Flores state that the conglomerate strategy is utilised by CSOs to establish financial sustainability, expand focus areas, or boost organisational exposure. At this level, CSOs as social conglomerates may be able to serve as feeders for government programs while avoiding the Type 3 Swakelola finance model, which limits CSOs to project implementation.

CSOs with the credentials mentioned above are expected to initiate cross-actor collaboration in a variety of ways, including serving as a clearinghouse for financing opportunity information, learning about fundraising, and even dispersing cash and resources outside of their conglomerate structure. As a social conglomerate, the CSO can collaborate with funders to create novel funding arrangements that exploit organisational strengths, or program models that can provide social or economic advantages (social entrepreneurship).

Sustainability and Alternatives to CSO Funding. Indonesian CSOs have begun to address their reliance on foreign funding. Alternative sources have been investigated in various ways, yielding varying results. Indeed, donor financing has helped to accelerate the development of diversification skills. However, this assistance has not yet reached a large proportion of the Indonesian CSO population.

According to a survey on CSO financial resilience, only 34 percent of 113 CSO respondents got grants from donor agencies to improve organisational funding sustainability (YAPPIKA, 2021). Due to the limited reach of aid, only 11 percent of CSO grantees were able to lessen their reliance on donors. The remainder are still stuck in the same conditions.

With such a low success rate, the alternative funding sources that CSOs did access only funded a small percentage of most organisations' operational costs. Less than a third of 'successful' CSOs relied on alternative financing sources to meet the majority of their operational expenditures, leaving little to support other CSOs or community initiatives.

Only 13 percent of the overall sample of CSOs is no longer dependent on foreign funding. They can get funds from a variety of sources, including government grants, advisory services, distinct business units, CSR, Type 3 Swakelola, and overseas donations. There are a small number of CSOs that benefit from financial sector investments. The majority of the sample CSOs are in Java and Madura, and none of them have an endowment fund or have looked at community giving as a source of organisational funding.

The data above stand in stark contrast to Indonesia's enormous potential, which has become the country with the most philanthropy populace over the last decade (World Giving Index, 2018). In Indonesia, mobilising generosity can yield significant impacts in a short period of time (Tribunnews, 2021).²⁹

The results of the small sample are not very encouraging. Outside of them, a variety of organisations, including ICW, LBH Jakarta, LBH APIK, WALHI, KKI WARSI, and Gemawan, have and continue to attempt to raise public funds for social justice goals. Although there has been no detailed study on the results of their respective initiatives, they came at the opportune time, coinciding with the rise of Indonesian philanthropy. In the last 15 years, the Indonesian philanthropy sector has expanded substantially. The majority are faith-based, particularly Islamic, while secular charity organisations are fairly uncommon (Hartnell, n.d.).

Another intriguing aspect to observe and predict is how faith-based charity organisations manage the funds they raise. According to a source, Hartnell unveiled a new approach to the use of charity funds for social justice.

Although some people are unfamiliar with the concept of social justice philanthropy (SJP), they are very familiar with organisations that receive philanthropic donations and focus on policy advocacy. Every successful advocacy activity supported by the funds is a generous gift to the advancement of social justice.

The findings presented above appear to highlight both drawbacks and opportunities for CSOs. The flaws discovered are related to the shortage and bluntness of CSOs techniques in mobilising community finance support for social justice. Hartnell identified hurdles in the form of mistrust and distrust that continue to exist in civil society. SJP is limited by a lack of philanthropic backing for social justice, as well as a lack of understanding of the concept.

²⁹ <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/04/08/kitabisa-com-berhasil-galang-dana-rp-64-miliar-untuk-korban-bencana-ntt>, viewed 20 December 2024 14:23 WIB.

However, some of these obstacles might be eliminated by simplifying the message that CSOs send to funders. This is consistent with Hartnell's report (n.d.). According to Suzy Hoetomo, former CEO of Body Shop Indonesia and a senior official of Greenpeace and KEHATI official, the issue of 'education services' is easier to digest and mobilise than the issue of 'right to education', and 'helping migrant workers' is more effective than 'fighting for workers' rights'.

YAPPIKA's experience in mobilising individual giving demonstrates that simple statements may mobilise financial assistance from individual donors for basic health and education service programs, backed up by field data demonstrating urgency. To reinforce these ideas, YAPPIKA employs numerous basic accountability methods and binds its supporters in a variety of interactions with them.

While CSOs continue to be stigmatised and are not commonly trusted by donors, the presence of both religious and secular philanthropy organisations allows for indirect access to community philanthropy for social justice. Faith-based philanthropic organisations and family-owned philanthropy foundations should be considered as potential solutions to CSO funding challenges.

3.5. Talent and Training

The talent and training function supports the civil society ecosystem by educating, training, and coaching prospective CSO activists and personnel. With CSO recruitment bases in educational and research institutions, grassroots communities, and minority groups, the talent and training function is intended to operate in those areas. CSOs' work of educating, training, and equipping prospective activists with knowledge, critical thinking abilities, and technological skills addresses a number of internal difficulties.

ICSF 2024 participants, among others, recognised the issue of age differences, which hinder effective communication and discussion inside the organisation. In some circumstances, differences in habits, mindsets, interpersonal interaction methods, and technological adaptability make it difficult for employees of different generations to collaborate.

In such cases, variations in work ethics, technological mastery, perspective on life, and life goals frequently manifest as prejudice, reducing organisational cohesiveness. The elder generation's technical stumbling may limit communication and cooperation with the younger generation. Differences in life goals may motivate young activists to take more chances than their seniors, who are more conservative and cautious.

In this context, progressive and adaptive leadership is required to ensure openness, inclusiveness, and equality in the activities of CSOs. Such leadership will foster a healthy and productive civil society climate in which young activists can thrive and develop.

Aside from these difficulties, CSOs face the increasingly challenging task of attracting and maintaining young activists over time. The intergenerational gap may drive young activists away from CSOs or encourage them to pursue opportunities in other sectors. However, there are a number of other things to consider.

First, CSOs neglected to recognise grassroots communities, marginalised groups, people with disabilities, and gender minorities as potential sources of members, activists, and staff for the organisation's long-term viability. Some CSOs, with their distinct local circumstances, do not appear to have strong roots in grassroots communities. Except for organisations that campaign for disability rights and gender justice, very few CSOs employ people with disabilities or who identify as transgender.

CSOs that began as community-supporting organisations did not become community-based CSOs by recruiting activists and staff from local resource inventory. This decision reduces the pool of CSO activists and personnel available for recruitment.

Second, most CSOs do not incorporate capacity building into the organisational learning cycle. Many CSOs lack a learning cycle designed to navigate future sustainability issues. The mentoring --and reverse mentoring-- processes, as well as training, take place sporadically and without intention, by project and piecemeal, with no strategy in place to complete the big picture of the organisational development plans.

Third, CSOs often recruit members and activists through official educational institutions such as academies and universities. In fact, the increasingly commercial world of education has limited students' ability to absorb the spirit of activism and learn subjects outside of the classroom.

State universities that require substantial sums of money from students are more likely to obey to repressive states, jeopardising the long-term viability of academies and universities as a source of critical thinking, a nursery for opposition seeds, and pro-democracy activists. Private institutions may allow their students more freedom to become activists, ensuring that there is still a base for recruiting CSO members.³⁰

³⁰ <https://www.detik.com/sumut/berita/d-7503499/rektor-iii-ajak-ratusan-dosen-ikut-demo-tolak-revisi-uu-pilkada> accessed 7 November 12:05, or see also https://youtu.be/gEFJNmMR_e8?si=RcPtG8HzgEkcvzbl

Fourth, CSOs must compete more strongly with political parties for their activist base. Political groups that grew rapidly following the New Order were 'alternatives' outside of civil society that promised careers to youthful activists. Although this 'promise' was more important than the opportunity for political parties to maintain members (Haryanto, Rahmawati, Lay; 2023), student activists in the 1990s followed in the footsteps of their seniors in the New Order era by joining political parties and becoming national politicians (BBC.com, 2024).³¹ Under the guise of changing from within, pro-democracy activists found a justification to join political parties and vie for seats in parliament.³²

Apart from their performance in parliament, exposure about their acts and achievements produces a demonstration effect, making political parties more appealing than CSOs for recruiting young people. Furthermore, many elite CSO activists have entered power politics and joined political parties since the early 2000s (Samadhi and Abhiseka, 2023).

Fifth, CSOs continue to operate in traditional ways even while the ecosystem rapidly changes. CSOs continue to be on the traditional non-profit side of the spectrum, with the profit-oriented business sector on the other end. This position of CSOs does not provide the incentives needed by young activists, with different life goals and outlooks than their predecessors.

The volunteer and ideological motives inherent in the non-profit sector are being challenged by the social enterprise model, which balances the two extremes while promising to achieve both social and business goals. Growing social enterprises, as well as a more responsible corporate sector, provide opportunities for young people to meet their activism urge and achieve their life goals.³³

3.6. Incubation and Acceleration

Although there are no integrated and up-to-date statistics, it is thought that the number of CSOs in Indonesia, both registered and unregistered, increased dramatically after Soeharto's fall in 1998. The quick expansion of civic space, combined with political decentralisation, produced an enabling environment for CSOs to flourish concurrently and swiftly (Haryanto, Rahmawati, Lay, 2023).

31 <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/majalah-65595155>, accessed 7 November 09:12 WIB

32 <https://suaramahasiswa.info/alternatif/artikel/masuk-parlemen-jalur-aktivis-mengubah-sistem-dari-dalam/> accessed 7 November 09:15 WIB

33 <https://mekari.com/blog/perkembangan-social-enterprise-di-indonesia/> accessed 7 November, 12:23 WIB

Citizens can easily establish or dissolve CSOs in a somewhat open political environment. With a wide range of sectors into which CSOs might operate, including many advocacy domains, the mushrooming of CSOs at the time was fuelled by an influx of foreign cash (development aid) from abroad, particularly for the promotion of democracy and good governance.

After more than 25 years of the mushrooming phenomena, the civil society ecosystem in Indonesia has documented the emergence and dissolution of CSOs for a variety of reasons. In general, the pulse of CSOs operating in the anti-corruption and governance sectors, for example, has been shown to fall following the completion of large good governance programs.

If not collapse (mediaklabarnew.com, 2021)³⁴ they can only make press releases on occasion. Organisations that were initially dedicated to providing grassroots help for budget advocacy at the regional level compromised their advocacy themes by include elements of the climate crisis, extractive industries, and so on.

A comprehensive approach to CSO programming gives sufficient reasons to address various concerns within the core program. This is not a bad perspective, but it may cause CSO to lose direction, diverge from its initial route, and abandon the urgency in its local context. As a result, the major ideas and principles that represent a CSO's *raison d'être* are abandoned in favour of something considered to be larger, have a broader impact, and require immediate attention.

While not explaining all of CSOs' ups and downs, what is going on in the anti-corruption and governance sectors illustrates a clear contrast; sectoral urgency does not always correspond to CSOs' ability to adapt to the situation. This was also felt by participants at the ICSF 2024.

They discovered that some CSOs lacked the resources necessary to ground large ideas or begin carrying out programs, despite the obvious urgency in the sectors in which they work. At this point, CSOs' condition might be projected onto their environment in order to better assess the problem.

One of the criticisms raised by the preceding circumstance is the scarcity of financial support for CSOs that are just beginning their life cycle. Even if the major idea that inspired the CSO's formation is important in its local context, a lack of donor support will prevent it from moving further.

³⁴ <https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2020/06/09/sejumlah-lembaga-swadaya-masyarakat-di-ntt-terancam-bubar> and <https://mediakalbarnews.com/setahun-berkiprah-fw-lsm-kalbar-bubar/>, viewed 13 November 10:31 WIB

Table 3.6.1. Types of Incubator Services for CSOs

Services	Description
Funding	Incubators offers support, including workshops and help with grant proposal writing.
Physical Space	Incubators offers workspace or office space to begin operations.
Accounting	Incubator offers guidance on accounting and cost control challenges.
Communication	Incubator provides advice on outreach, marketing, social media and press releases.
Organisational Structure	Incubator provides advice on the internal structure of the organisation, including providing training and mentoring for staff and managers.
Legal Service	Incubator conducts litigation advocacy and provides legal consultation.
Consultancy	Incubators supports the creation of sustainability strategies, offer guidance on handling new problems, organisational objectives, program development, and idea generation.
Technical Service	Incubator provides resources for website development, internet coverage, IT services, etc.
Network	Incubator connects CSOs with other organisations, private businesses or other organisations that are beneficial to CSOs.

Source: Carmody et al., 2023

When scarcity outweighs resilience, CSOs may collapse before they can participate in civil society activities. The third issue is a lack of organisations or networks that specifically provide development support services to budding CSOs. Even if they exist, such assistance is more inadvertent and infrequent.

However, service provider organisations can provide incubation and acceleration services. With their individual strengths they can assist emerging CSOs in developing organisational structures and governance pillars, administrative systems, and connecting young CSOs with networks for access to resources and collaboration opportunities (see Table 3.6.1). However, the supply of incubation services, which need a wide range of capabilities, must be organised using the appropriate method.

Local services. Complex incubation services require the presence of service providers with a wide range of skills. A single organisation cannot supply all forms of incubation services. In this context, new CSOs must determine whether certain services are available locally. CSOs must have a thorough understanding of the resource endowment and actors in their local area in order to meet incubation needs more quickly and affordably.

CSOs can access universities and colleges located throughout Indonesia's provinces, which serve as research institutes. In general, colleges offer legal assistance services, which are open to the public.

For this type of incubation service, CSOs can consider cooperating with surrounding institutions. Access beyond the region is provided to bridge the gap between CSO incubation demands and resources available from local providers.

Decentralisation of Resource Hubs. Service provider organisations are concentrated in Java, particularly Jakarta. Incubation services that involve the physical presence of advisors or mentors at the client's site will cost more. Due to a lack of financing sources, physical travel between islands may separate young CSOs from incubation services that should be prioritised.

It may be possible to ensure the presence of incubation institutions in the areas, taking into account the needs and availability of local resources. Investing in decentralised resource hubs based on regions, albeit costly, will enable young CSOs to make important contributions to civil society in those regions.



A comprehensive incubation plan. In many circumstances, incubator organisations supply clients with incubation services that are fragmented, project-based, and not organised into a comprehensive work plan within a reasonable time frame.

A holistic development strategy, rather than individual components, should be used to guide the deployment of incubation services. When faced with competing priorities, young CSOs must adhere to the strategy.

Internet-based Services. For an archipelagic country like Indonesia, digital technologies and the internet provide numerous benefits. The internet and digital technologies enable CSOs to engage and communicate in real time, as well as worldwide connectivity, remote work, automation, data-driven decision-making, and, most importantly, e-learning.

Using the current digital communication infrastructure, traditional incubation services such as mentoring, help, and advice may be delivered remotely. Once the infrastructure is in place, the transition from analogue to digital platforms will make it easier to provide incubation and acceleration services to young CSOs in need.

**REKOMENDASI
& ALTERNATIF
STRATEGI**

KONSOLIDASI

**SITUASI
OMS**

MERAWAT

EKSPLORASI

**MELAWAN
PENYEMPITAN
RUANG SIPIL**

**KEAMANAN
HOLISTIK**

**MEMBANGUN
KAPASITAS**

**COLLECTIVE
CARE ..**

**INKUBASI
& AKSELERASI**

**MEMPERKUAT
JARINGAN**

**PENGUATAN
LEMBAGA
PUBLIK ..**

**SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

**DAN ..
KOLABORASI**

**MODEL
PENDANAAN**

REGENERASI

**DIGITAL
LITERACY**

**RESOURCE
HUB**

PART 4 | RECOMMENDATION AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

In general, the majority of suggestions from all rounds of ICSF 2024 are technical in character, with ambiguous wording that do not distinguish between long-term and short-term initiatives. To create a more systematic concept map, the team uses storming to group technical proposals into strategic thought clusters.

The clusters of strategic ideas will serve as the headings for recommendations and options. From the clusters of ideas that develop, recommendations and alternatives may point to multiple actors, with the ecosystem's function not always solitary; CSOs, donors, corporations, research institutes, universities, philanthropy organisations, and so on.

This portion benefits considerably from the five scenario testing sessions held during the main round of ICSF 2024: surviving, growing, marginalised, controlled, and unexpected. However, rather than following the scenario distinction, the recommendations in this section are based on participants' formulations of potential collaborations on the five key issues of ICSF 2024, which are: countering the shrinking civic space, the situation of CSOs (capacity, technical, and funding), strengthening networks and collaboration, polarisation and discrimination, and regeneration (internal and external).

The strategy formulation in this section is based on recommendations from ICSF 2024 participants with defined ideas and topics. We set aside proposals that are too ambiguous, contain incomplete sentences, cannot be confirmed and corroborated, or cannot be cross-checked. The recommendations listed below are organised by strategy type and assigned to the appropriate ecological function. Each heading comprises technological strategies presented in no particular order.

4.1. Civic Space

4.1.1. Developing and maintaining CSOs consolidation

This strategy seeks to harness the power of CSOs across sectors and generations in order to build civil society and garner support from governments, independent institutions, the media, academics, and corporations. The increased power of CSOs is expected to boost their efficacy in providing checks and balances for actors in the governmental and business sectors.

Some anticipated consolidation efforts:

- ICSF takes responsibility as organiser of CSOs consolidation.
- Designing and implementing an agenda to seize and win public space with civil society discourse through secure communication channels.
- Compiling a map of actors and their power in relevant areas for consolidation and collaboration.
- Developing and strengthening interconnected critical knowledge nodes for civil society action.
- Strengthening organic CSO networks, including on social media, through legal aid, cooperation, capacity building, community research, and knowledge exchange.

4.1.2. Building CSOs Capacity

In order to overcome the difficulties of funding, knowledge and analysis, advocacy and collaboration, and good governance, this strategy generally seeks to foster a critical and adaptive attitude and practice within CSOs.

- Building 'Civil Society Leadership Academy' to organise capacity building for civil society with the following themes:
 - Critical education and ideological insight for civil society.
 - Sustainability and alternative financing/funding models for CSOs (social investment, impact investment, blended finance, fundraising business).
 - Database/inventory of local wisdom to support research and development cooperation, advocacy and collaboration, good governance, alternative media, and thematic/sectoral libraries.
 - Construction of alternative organisational models to be adaptive to the actual situation.
 - Human rights, justice and gender equality (GEDSI, inclusion, intersectionality, etc.)
 - Voter and political education for young people.
 - Accompaniment and organisation of communities, marginalised groups and victims.
 - Peace and conflict resolution.
- Building community of practice by utilising organic function of CSO network and umbrella organisation.

4.1.3. Holistic Security

Building and strengthening the organisation's collective care policies and practices, as well as expanding the holistic security service infrastructure for CSOs, are the goals of this holistic security strategy.

- Strengthening holistic security infrastructure (collective care) at the national level with sustainable funding, and connecting to subnational networks.
- Initiating the development of holistic security infrastructure that is accessible at the subnational level (shelters, safe spaces, legal aid and paralegal, etc.).
- Helping CSOs create organisational-level collective care models for holistic security that can be replicated.
- Providing support for the preparation of safeguards and protocols for CSOs (PSEAH, child protection, etc.).
- Organising platforms for learning and reflection on the use of safeguards.
- Strengthening the capacity of CSOs for digital literacy and digital security.
- Developing CSO capabilities in the field of information technology for response and adaptation in disaster and crisis situations.

4.1.4. Strengthening public institutions

The strategy of strengthening public institutions remains important to implement with the aim of maintaining and expanding civic space, through strengthening governance, perspectives, policies, and practices of government institutions and officials.

- Advocacy encourages public institutions to perform well in specific areas identified by ICSF2024 participants, such as inclusion at the village level, village funds with a GEDSI perspective, evidence-based policy advocacy, student parliaments, and inclusive public communication through sign language classes.
- Developing understanding about diverse approaches to improve public institutions. The focus of strengthening areas must be regularly examined, updated, and altered based on the outcomes of the CSO network's risk analysis.

4.2. Incubation and Acceleration

Through capacity-building services offered by regional intermediaries, this strategy seeks to promote the expansion of early-phase CSOs. This means that bringing the presence of intermediaries that function as resource centres closer to the CSOs that will be served is also crucial to this strategy.

- Expand regional resource hubs to facilitate the growth of early-stage CSOs with organisational development services.
- Connect early-stage CSOs with other institutions for innovative program collaboration and financing (e.g. social entrepreneurship).
- Develop hubs for resource sharing (knowledge, small grants, etc.)

4.3. Public Perception

Through capacity-building services offered by regional intermediaries, this strategy seeks to promote the expansion of early-phase CSOs. This means that bringing the presence of intermediaries that function as resource centres closer to the CSOs that will be served is also crucial to this strategy.

4.3.1. New narratives

- Strengthening the image of social movements and CSOs by offering new narratives and symbols that are simple and ‘compelling’ through social media networks and platforms.
- Involving mass media and journalists more intensively and consistently in disseminating information about contributions and good news from CSOs.

4.3.2. Fight against disinformation

- Collaborate with journalists, content creator communities, fact-checking and anti-hoax organisations to counter disinformation about civil society and CSOs.

4.4. Funding Model

This strategy aims to facilitate the identification, exploration, trialling of alternative fundraising and financing for CSOs, and to draw on collective learning to identify good practices for further development of CSO funding models.

4.4.1. Alternative funding

- Finding and building alternative funding sources for the sustainability of CSOs.
- Establishing an endowment fund from non-government funding sources (philanthropy, individual donors, etc.) for CSOs.
- Partnering with professional partners for public fundraising, trialing digital or face-to-face donations, regular or one-off donations or crowdfunding.
- Exploring funding from CSR, family foundations, or corporate foundations.

4.4.2. Alternative financing

- Facilitating CSOs to explore new approaches to program management such as social investment, social enterprise or community investment.

4.4.3. Lesson learned

- Identify pioneering organisations for alternative fundraising for CSOs learning.
- Facilitate learning forums for alternative funding and financing models.

4.5. Talent and Knowledge

The strategy on talent and knowledge functions targets two aspects, namely recruitment and organisational management. This strategy aims to instill regeneration and member practices within CSOs.

4.5.1. Activist recruitment

- Engage grassroots, local youth, representing diverse identities through engagement in civil society movements and CSOs.
- Organise training, briefings and mentoring for young activists with themes tailored to the needs of the organisation.
- Organise reverse mentoring to close the intergenerational gap in specific areas; for example, digital/information technology, utilisation of social media for communication, networking and resource mobilisation, etc.

4.5.2. Organisational management practices

- Establishing the notion of intergenerational leadership in organisational management.
- Managing employees using professional standards and defined career and remuneration system.
- Maintaining the values of equality and democracy, mutual respect, and volunteerism in organisation culture.
- Encourage and provide opportunities for young activists to grow and accept responsibilities within organisation.

4.6. Local Context/Location and Event

This strategy seeks to increase the relevance of CSOs in its local context.

- Beneficiaries should be involved in the organisation in a meaningful way, particularly by developing community feedback mechanism.
- Periodically assess the organisation's relevance in the local context.
- Affirming the organisation's function and existence in CSO and civil society networks, as well as in the actor map of its environment.

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